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ABSTRACT 
Jeffersonianism and 19th Century American Maritime Defense 
Policy 
 
By 
Christopher T. Ziegler 
 
This paper analyzes the fundamental maritime defense 
mentality that permeated America throughout the early part 
of the Republic. For fear of economic debt and foreign wars, 
Thomas Jefferson and his Republican party opposed the 
construction of a formidable blue water naval force. 
Instead, they argued for a small naval force capable of 
engaging the Barbary pirates and other small similar forces. 
For protection of the nation and commerce, they wanted a 
strictly defensive strategy developed around coastal 
gunboats and harbor fortifications. This research will 
analyze the naval aspect of this defense mentality from its 
creation in 1794 through the War of 1812. The coastal 
defense analysis will begin at the same time and conclude 
with the end of the American Civil War.  
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
Modern military thinkers have long criticized the 
defensive stance the early American Republic adopted against 
European hostilities. The purpose of this research is to 
investigate and analyze the failure of the American 
strategic maritime policy during the early years of the 
republic. Maritime defense has many accepted principles, 
most of which were neglected for various reasons during this 
time. As a result, America was ill equipped for war 
throughout much of the nineteenth century. The lack of an 
effective naval force yet presence of a strong, thriving, 
and vital commercial maritime trade set the stage for a 
great deal of international tension and unique political 
ideologies. 
To a certain degree this lack of preparedness is 
explained by the financial weakness and small population of 
the fledgling nation. As significant as the limited 
resources, were the beliefs and political rhetoric of Thomas 
Jefferson. Jefferson’s policies contained two distinctive 
flaws. First, he believed a large naval contingent was not 
beneficial because of the friction its existence would incur 
from European powers. He feared this friction would only 
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help in establishing a reason for Europe to expand its 
belligerency into American matters. Jefferson’s strict 
reliance upon a primarily defensive maritime military 
posture ultimately failed in preventing war with Europe. His 
second miscalculation was his theory that America’s 
commercial power could provide an effective influence over 
warring nations. Jefferson argued that if the U.S. could not 
afford to protect the commercial fleets, then they should be 
recalled to American ports in time of war. Nations requiring 
American goods would have to come to the U.S. and accept the 
responsibility of transport aboard their own vessels. This 
strategic use of commercial control also proved ineffective. 
 We will analyze this information in four chapters. The 
first chapter will deal with Thomas Jefferson and his 
political and ideological thoughts. This will include 
biographical information about Jefferson and the education 
that would form this revolutionary’s mind. His ideology will 
be scrutinized to explain how it influenced American defense 
policy and its specific application to the United States 
Navy and coastal defense construction programs. The second 
chapter will explain accepted strategic naval and maritime 
policy, illustrating flaws in Jefferson’s perceptions of 
defense and war. Chapter three will discuss naval 
development during Jefferson’s presidency. A brief 
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examination of the origins of the navy under the Federalist 
administration will be provided for the sake of comparison. 
This period of study will end with the conclusion of the War 
of 1812. The fourth chapter centers upon the numerous 
construction programs involving fortifications and coastal 
defense along the American seaboard. Under Jeffersonian 
policy these purely defensive measures were the ideal system 
for the fledgling nation. Combining defense with low 
maintenance cost, they could be manned by small inexpensive 
garrisons. In time of war Jefferson’s coveted militia could 
man them. They would serve as the most significant arm in 
Jefferson’s strictly defensive policy when coupled with the 
small gunboat fleets. This study will begin in 1794 and 
conclude with the American Civil War. 
 It is hoped that by the end of this work the reader 
will have an understanding of the various elements that 
influenced the early American political, commercial, and 
military experience. Hopefully, a clear distinction will be 
made between the pragmatic limitations and ideological 
principles that shaped the early American defense policy. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
THOMAS JEFFERSON AND ENLIGHTENED DEFENSE 
 
 
 
 Thomas Jefferson was born on April 13, 1743, in what is 
now Albemarle County, Virginia.1 Except for occasions when he 
was away on state business, he spent his entire life on the 
plantation of his birth until his death on July 4, 1826.2 By 
birthright, Jefferson was a Virginia aristocrat in taste, 
education, and upbringing. It was his involvement in 
politics and his study of the European Enlightenment that 
shaped his ideological principles. Jefferson was a man of 
many talents. Both a politician and philosopher, he was also 
fascinated with science and was an avid inventor, architect, 
educator, geographer, ethnologist, and agriculturist.  
 It was his role in the winning of American independence 
and the formation of its government for which he is so 
widely known. To understand the motives for the actions that 
led to this fame, many aspects of Jefferson’s complicated 
and tumultuous life must be understood. Given the scope of 
the research of this paper, the facets of Jefferson’s life 
examined will of necessity be limited to four basic areas. 
                                                
1
 Jefferson, Thomas. Complete Anas of Thomas Jefferson. New York: De Capo 
Press, 1970. p. 15 
2
 IBID 
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First, an analysis of his enlightened upbringing will be 
addressed to provide background into the shaping of his 
mentality. Second, his views that an ideal republican 
society should be agrarian based. Third, his hatred of 
national debt and his belief that the “earth belongs to the 
living”. Fourth, the synthesis of these various factors and 
how they came to shape his desire for a defensive military. 
Education and Formative Years 
 The first seven years of Jefferson’s life was spent on 
the James River a few miles north of Richmond, Virginia. It 
was here that Jefferson began his education at the “English 
School”.3 At the age of nine he began to undertake the study 
of Greek and Latin under the direction of Reverend William 
Douglas. After the death of his father on August 17, 1757, 
Jefferson began to receive instruction from Reverend James 
Maury, for whom he had a great admiration.4 He developed a 
mastery of classical languages and found great delight in 
the study of ancient Greek and Roman works of literature. In 
March 1760 he began his education at the College of William 
and Mary from which he graduated two years later. In 
Williamsburg he received his first experience observing 
government in action. With his study of the classics and 
                                                
3
 Peterson, Merrill ed., Thomas Jefferson: A Reference Biography. New 
York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1986. p. 2 
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legal history, he was well prepared for an occupation in the 
interpretation of law when in 1767 he was admitted to the 
bar.5 He maintained the career despite his relative dislike 
of court practice until the eve of the revolution when he 
abandoned it.  
 In 1770 Jefferson was appointed county lieutenant of 
Albemarle. The previous year he had become a member of the 
House of Burgess and remained in that capacity until its 
demise in 1775.6 Jefferson, a poor public speaker, found it 
better to put his talents to use as a literary draftsman and 
did great services in legislative bodies and on committees. 
In this capacity Jefferson proved instrumental in aiding the 
formation of the Virginia Committee of Correspondence and 
was selected to be a member of that eleven-man committee. 
His actions in the pre-revolutionary movement progressed 
steadily and culminated in the writing of A Summary View of 
the Rights of British America. Besides the Declaration of 
Independence this is considered by many to be Jefferson’s 
most important Revolutionary work. Its purpose was to 
present to the world community an apology for the actions 
taken by the American colonies against Great Britain. 
                                                                                                                                              
4
 Randall, Willard. Thomas Jefferson: A Life. New York: Henry Holt and 
Company, 1993 p 16 & 21 
5
 Colbourn, H. “Thomas Jefferson’s use of the Past.” William and Mary 
Quarterly. 15 (1958): p 59. 
6
 Jefferson, Complete Anas, p 17 
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In A Summary View of the Rights of British America, 
Jefferson argues the combined grievances set forth by the 
colonies. As he put it “humbly to hope that this their joint 
address, penned in the language of truth, and divested of 
those expressions of servility which would persuade his 
Majesty that we were asking favours, and not rights, shall 
obtain from his Majesty a more respectful acceptance.”7 Until 
this point, each respective colony had its own agenda for 
splitting with England. This work created a unified 
justification for why the colonies had the right to revolt 
and listed what crimes parliament and the King had committed 
against them. Throughout it, Jefferson made use of the 
rhetoric of John Locke, arguing that the once free colonists 
were being ruled and governed by England in a manner to 
which they did not consent and which thereby violated their 
natural rights as prescribed by nature. Jefferson made great 
use of the argument that the legislative assemblies tasked 
by law with governing the colonies could not be superceded 
by Parliament, the specific example being the suspension of 
the New York state Legislature. As Jefferson explained,  
“One free and independent legislature herby takes upon 
itself to suspend the powers of another, free and 
                                                
7
 Jefferson, Thomas. A Summary view of the Rights of British America. 
reprinted from the original edition. New York: B. Franklin, 1971. p 13 
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independent as itself; this exhibiting a phenomenon unknown 
in nature.”8 He argued that the crown should use its veto 
power to prevent the passage of laws by one legislature 
within the empire that might in anyway disrupt the rights 
and interests of another. Throughout this pivotal early 
work, Jefferson also made ironic use of the rights of free 
trade and commerce. He argues, “That the exercise of a free 
trade with all the parts of the world, possessed by the 
American colonists, as of natural right, and which no law of 
their own had taken away or abridged, was next the object of 
unjust encroachment.”9 This exhibits one of the earliest 
public references Jefferson made in defense of American 
commerce. This early trend favoring the protection of 
American commerce foreshadows his later policy of using 
America’s commerce instead of war as a lever to sway 
European policy. Jefferson would, throughout his career, 
work to improve and expand American trade. He always feared 
the possibility of this trade inducing international 
disorder and conflict for the new nation. 
In 1779, Jefferson was elected wartime governor of 
Virginia. Four years later he was elected to Congress and 
remained there until assuming the role of Ambassador to 
                                                
8
 IBID p 20 
9
 IBID p 16 
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France in 1785.10 The next four years in France he 
established a fondness for that country that would, in many 
ways, influence his political and diplomatic views. Upon his 
return to America, he assumed the position of Secretary of 
State under President George Washington. He would resign 
this position within three years, only to be elected Vice 
President of the United States under John Adams. Public 
support for Jefferson’s liberal democratic sentiments won 
him the Presidency of the United States in 1801, which he 
repeated in 1805. His second term ended on March 4, 1809, 
and he never again journeyed outside of his native state. He 
chose to continue to influence and disseminate his ideas 
through the medium of letter writing.11 
Jefferson’s political experience and academic 
upbringing was shaped by the teachings and philosophy of the 
European enlightenment, with its roots imbedded in the 
classical political and philosophic notions of the Greeks 
and Romans.12  These factors propelled Jefferson toward 
republicanism. Jefferson’s personal tendencies outside the 
world of academics also influenced his policies. This led to 
                                                
10
 Banning, Lance. The Jeffersonian Persuasion: Evolution of a Party 
Ideology. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1978. p. 215 
11
 Spivak, Burton. Jefferson’s English Crisis: Commerce Embargo and the 
Republican Revolution. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 
1979. p. 3 & 199 
12
 Shalhope, Robert. “Thomas Jefferson’s Republicanism and Antebellum 
Southern Thought.” The Journal of Southern History. 42 (1976): p 531. 
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a fear of military engagements and centralized power in 
general.13  
Jefferson throughout his life was a disciple of the 
eighteenth century notion of warfare. In essence, war was an 
act between two governments and not their inhabitants. 
According to Jefferson, war was a limited rational 
instrument of policy to be used expressly for limited 
objectives after all other options had been exhausted.14 At 
the same time this followed the optimistic view of the 
enlightenment that all aspects of human actions can be 
controlled by rationality, even war. Once declared, 
Jefferson argued that war must at all costs be conducted in 
a civilized manner. Although he recognized the occasional 
need for war, he viewed it as a measure of last resort 
because of the extreme long-term economic consequences it 
could have on the citizenry. Many of his ideological views 
were tempered by his practical experience in the political 
arena in his formative years. Many of the ideals fostered by 
enlightened thought were quickly dispelled by his experience 
                                                
13
 Peterson, Merrill ed., The Political Writings of Thomas Jefferson. 
Annapolis: The Thomas Jefferson Memorial Foundation, 1993. Note: Many 
examples of Jefferson’s inherent distrust of centralized governments and 
federal authority can be seen throughout his letters and speeches. Of 
particular example here see the following letters. The page numbers the 
letters occupy in this collection, as well as there titles and the 
addressee will be provided. “The Earth Belongs to the Living”, to James 
Madison, September 6, 1789, p 100; “More on a Bill of Rights”, to James 
Madison, March 15, 1789, p 90-91; “Strengthening the State Governments”, 
to Archibald Stuart, December 23, 1791, p 105. 
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in politics. In particular was the view that through 
rationality all humans and their endeavors will progress to 
a level of perfection found in nature.15  
Jefferson’s Republic 
 The ideal form of government envisioned by Jefferson 
was the republic. As he explained in a letter to Pierre-
Samuel Du Pont de Nemours on July 14, 1807, “What is 
practicable must often control what is pure theory: and the 
habits of the governed determine in a great degree what is 
practicable.”16 Because the citizens of a true republic are 
indeed the masters of there own lives, they should be 
trustworthy, educated, and above all socially evolved enough 
to handle governing responsibilities. The citizens Jefferson 
refers to here are expected to be small landowning farmers. 
In a true enlightened fashion, born of agrarian ideals, 
Jefferson wrote that only the simplistic and productive 
occupation of farming or planting was righteous enough to be 
suitable for a citizen in the republic. Echoed since the 
times of Aristotle, town dwellers and those engaged 
primarily in industry and commerce have been seen as morally 
inferior to farmers. This philosophy is based upon the 
                                                                                                                                              
14
 IBID “Your Prophecy and Mine”, To John Adams, January 11, 1816, p 181 
15
 IBID “ Limits of the Practicable”, To P. S. Dupont de Nemours, January 
18, 1802, p 145 
16
 Appleby, Joyce, “What is Still American in the Political Philosophy of 
Thomas Jefferson?” William and Mary Quarterly. 39 (1982): p 294 
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notion that the simple lifestyle, with its lack of self-
motivated competition, is more pure and thus closer to the 
natural world as explained by John Locke and prescribed to 
by Thomas Jefferson. In Locke’s explanation of nature, “To 
understand political power aright, and derive it from its 
original, we must consider what estate all men are naturally 
in, and that is, a state of perfect freedom to order their 
actions and dispose of their possessions and persons as they 
think fit, within the bounds of the Law of Nature without 
asking leave or depending upon the will of any other man.”17 
Jefferson equated simple farming to being as close as 
possible in the current state of man, to being one with the 
natural world, far from the corruption and greed that grows 
and feeds in cities and urban populations. 
 Jefferson focuses his general attitudes about 
government and the military in a letter to Elbridge Gerry on 
January 26, 1799. Entitled A Profession of Political Faith, 
Jefferson explains:  
“… I am for a government rigorously frugal & simple, applying all 
the possible savings of the public venue to the discharge of the 
national debt; and not for a multiplication of officers & salaries 
merely to make partisans, & for increasing, by every device, the 
public debt, on the principle of it’s being a public blessing. I am 
                                                
17Locke, John. Locke on Politics, Religion, and Education. New York: 
Collier Books, 1965. p. 20  
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for relying, for internal defense, on our militia solely, till 
actual invasion, and for such a naval force only as may protect our 
coasts and harbors from such depredations as we have experienced; 
and not for a standing army in time of peace, which may overawe the 
public sentiment; nor for a navy, which by it’s own expenses and 
the eternal wars in which it will implicate us, will grind us with 
public burdens, & sink us under them. I am for free commerce with 
all nations; political connections with none; & little or no 
diplomatic establishment.”18 
 Immediately following the American Revolution, 
Jefferson sought to create his ideal agrarian republic in 
his home state of Virginia. It was widely believed that only 
strong centralized governments could effectively administer 
large areas. In essence, Jefferson did not yield to the 
notion that the United States was a Republic, but rather an 
alliance of thirteen smaller republics. The grand republican 
experiment would unfold in each of the colonies and 
Jefferson was of course focused on that evolution in his 
home state. A key factor in the establishment of a new 
republic was the abolition of the monarchy and all its 
tendencies. What Jefferson feared above all else was 
governmental control. In keeping with the ideals of the 
revolution, he firmly believed that revolution was a good 
                                                
18
 Thomas Jefferson to Elbridge Jerry, 26 January 1779, Letters. 
Jefferson, Thomas, 1743-1826. Charlottesville:(University of Virginia 
Library Electronic Text Center, University of Virginia Library.) 1993. 
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and necessary thing. If the power of the government was 
indeed derived from the consent of the people being 
governed, then if the populous decided that the government 
was no longer working for them and protecting their rights, 
then they were entitled and even required to revolt. 
The Earth Belongs to the Living 
 Another key building block of Jefferson’s outlook that 
would shape his military and maritime doctrine was his 
disapproval of a national debt. Throughout a significant 
portion of his life, Jefferson was plagued with a never-
ending debt that deeply troubled him. In a letter to 
Nicholas Lewis in 1787, Jefferson wrote, “The torment of 
mind I endure till the moment shall arrive when I shall not 
owe a shilling on earth is such really as to render life of 
little value.”19 Jefferson began to argue vehemently that 
Americans should eliminate the debt incurred in previous 
wars prior to engaging in another. Elected to the Presidency 
in 1800, Jefferson continued to dwell on the abolition of 
the increasing American debt left over from the four years 
of government spending at the hands of the Federalist under 
John Adams. His stringent economic plans, created by Albert 
Gallatin, were designed to radically reduce government 
                                                                                                                                              
http://etext.lib.virginia.edu/Jefferson (hereafter cited as Letters, 
followed by the section number,) 1056-57. 
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spending and lower the debt. At the heart of this decrease 
in government spending was the downsizing of the fledgling 
American military. In his first inaugural address delivered 
on March 4, 1801, Jefferson eludes to the impending change 
when he remarks,  
“the vital principle of republics, from which is no appeal but to 
force, the vital principle and immediate parent of despotism; a 
well-disciplined militia, our best reliance in peace and for the 
first moments of war till the regulars may relieve them; the 
supremacy of the civil over the military authority; economy in the 
public expense that labor maybe lightly burthened; the honest 
payment of our debts and sacred preservation of the public faith; 
encouragement of agriculture, and of commerce as its handmaiden…”20  
If this was indeed a hint of things to come, then 
Jefferson’s First Annual Message delivered on December 8, 
1801, was the explanation to the public of just how much he 
was going to dismember the military. With respect to the 
army, Jefferson envisioned almost totally disbanding the 
professional regular army and relying on well-organized 
militia to repel or halt invaders long enough to allow 
regular troops to be mustered, trained, and dispatched to 
permanently repel the enemy. As he explained, “For defense 
                                                                                                                                              
19
 Stuart, Reginald. The Half-way Pacifist: Thomas Jefferson’s View of 
War. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1978. p. 13 
20
 First Innaugural Address, 4 March, 1801. Addresses, Messages and 
Replies. Jefferson, Thomas 1743-1826. Charlottesville: )University of 
Virginia Library Electronic Text Center, University of Virginia Library.) 
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against invasion, their number is as nothing; nor is it 
conceived needful or safe that a standing army should be 
kept up in time of peace for that purpose.”21 At the same 
time, Jefferson expressed the need for continued training 
and development of the militia system and the procurement 
and storage of the weapons and military goods needed should 
war erupt.  
Even more a budgetary target than the army, the navy 
was to suffer the greatest program cuts and redesign under 
the new administration. Under the Federalist’s influence, 
the navy had begun to grow with the construction of several 
new warships and the approval of funds for a number of 74-
gun ships-of-the-line. Under the direction of the Secretary 
of the Navy, Benjamin Stoddert, construction of these ship 
designs and the locations for construction had begun to 
progress to the point of commencement. Jefferson was 
critical of these ships and the expense they incurred. As he 
put it, “Whatever annual sum beyond that you may think 
proper to appropriate to naval perpetrations, would perhaps 
be better employed in providing those articles which may be 
kept without waste or consumption, and be in readiness when 
                                                                                                                                              
1993. http://etext.lib.virginia.edu/Jefferson (hereafter cited as 
Addresses, Messages and Replies, followed by section number), 495 
21
 IBID 
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any exigence calls them into use.”22 He immediately set about 
decreasing or suspending all together the funding of such 
programs. The only naval expenditure Jefferson was in favor 
of was the maintenance of a small fleet with which to keep a 
presence in the Mediterranean. Here, the United States had a 
long and constant antagonism with the Barbary States of 
North Africa.  
The only building program actively encouraged by 
Jefferson was the construction of the “Gunboat Fleet”. These 
small open vessels armed with only one or maybe two cannon 
would be useful only for harbor defense in conjuncture with 
land-based coastal fortifications. These small strictly 
defensive vessels were well suited to the Jeffersonian 
mentality of maintaining a strictly defensive military arm. 
Jefferson argued that these vessels could be cheaply 
maintained and stored ashore and manned by a maritime style 
militia until war was imminent. It was his opinion that 
there was no way this type of naval arm could in any way 
take actions abroad that could drag the United States into a 
global maritime conflict.23 Further discussion about the 
                                                
22
 Fist Annual Message, December 8, 1801. Addresses, Messages and 
Replies. 506 
23
 Special Message on Gun-Boats, To the Senate and House of 
Representatives of the United States, February 10, 1807. Addresses, 
Messages, and Replies, 541-542 
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gunboats and their effectiveness will be addressed in a 
later chapter. 
The largest military expenditure favored by Jefferson 
was the construction of defensive coastal works at strategic 
points around important harbors and ports. In Jefferson’s 
eyes they represented the epitome of strictly defensive 
military policies. They can in no way project military force 
or policy upon another nation. Once constructed, they would 
cost only a bare minimum to maintain with volunteer 
garrisons. Yet at the same time, should war ever necessitate 
their activation, they would offer the greatest and most 
direct protection of home and hearth. In this manner, they 
were the apex of the virtuous military expenditure; works of 
defense constructed in the direct presence of the population 
and manned by that populace when their sovereignty was 
threatened by unwarranted hostility. 
The fear of debt that resulted in these military cuts 
was a personal lifestyle dilemma faced by Jefferson. Being 
the intellectual that Jefferson was, he had to find some way 
to formulate this issue into an ideological stance that 
could be applied to the natural rights of the citizenry. 
This idea was a by-product of Jefferson alone and was 
constructed from his background in logical and enlightened 
thinking. He became convinced that the generations of 
 23
mankind were discrete, and that the form and conduct of 
public policy should be shaped with this in mind. This 
notion of the “Discrete Generation”, or that the earth was 
owned by the living, was the cornerstone of Jefferson’s 
philosophy regarding a political justification for limiting 
the creation of a massive national debt.24 As he put it in a 
letter to John Taylor in May, 1816, “by the laws of the 
Creator of the world, to the free possession of the earth he 
made for the sustenance, unencumbered by their predecessors, 
who, like them, were but tenants for life.”25 Jefferson 
argued that no generation had the right to create a debt by 
which the benefits of that debt were received by that 
generation whilst its payment was incurred upon another. In 
essence, no generation had the right to create a debt larger 
than what it was capable of paying off itself, thus 
relegating another to the servitude of the debt created by 
its predecessor. In Jefferson’s own words, it would  
“… exclude at the threshold of our new government the contagious 
and ruinous errors of this quarter of the globe, which have armed 
despots with means, not sanctioned by nature, for binding in chains 
their fellow men. We have already given in example one effectual 
check to the Dog of War by transferring the power of letting him 
                                                
24
 Smith, Daniel. “Population and Political Ethics: Thomas Jefferson’s 
Demography of Generations.” William and Mary Quarterly. 56 (1999): p 601. 
25
 Thomas Jefferson to John Taylor, 28 May, 1816. Letters. 1392 
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loose from the Executive to the Legislative body, from those who 
are to spend to those who are to pay.”26 
War and Strategy 
As demonstrated thus far, Jefferson was a man governed 
by rationality and principle. The foundation for this 
thought process lies within the doctrines prescribed by the 
Enlightenment. Jefferson was an optimist with regard to the 
supremacy and potential of rationality. He believed early 
on, that all aspects of social existence could be governed 
by the confines of rationality and logic. This notion 
included war, which Jefferson was a proponent of, given a 
suitable situation. The Barbary States of North Africa serve 
as an excellent example. Jefferson argued for war with the 
states as opposed to payment of tribute for safe passage of 
American shipping. In a letter to John Adams in 1786 he 
explains:  
“… if it is decided that we shall buy peace, I know no reason for 
delaying the operation, but should rather think it ought to be 
hastened. But I should prefer the obtaining it by war. 1. Justice 
is in favor of this opinion. 2. Honor favors it. 3. It will procure 
us respect in Europe, and respect is a safe guard to our interests. 
4. It will arm the federal head with the safest of all instruments 
of coercion over their delinquent members and prevent them from 
using what would be less safe….”27  
                                                
26
 Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, 6 September 1789. Letters. 1034 
27
 Thomas Jefferson to John Adams, 11 July 1786. Letters. 855 
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Jefferson viewed war as an extension of public policy, a 
tool for the populous and thus the government. Much of his 
early ideology can be seen in the Declaration of 
Independence. In it he stated that because Britain’s 
legislature had attempted to establish absolute rule by 
force of arms, an appropriately reciprocal response was 
justified and needed. This work came as a result of the 
clash between British troops and colonial militia at 
Lexington on April 19, 1775.28 He argued that the colonies 
were not engaging in hostilities for aggression or conquest, 
but rather as a response of hostilities enforced upon them. 
This provided the justification for armed resistance by 
arguing it was simply an action taken to preserve the 
colonies’ prescribed rights.  
This psychological need for the war to appear just and 
merely defensive stems a great deal from western Christian 
doctrine. As St Augustine explained:  
“…a good ruler will wage wars only if they are just. But surely, 
if he will only remember that he is a man, he will begin by 
bewailing the necessity he is under of waging even just wars. A 
good man would be under compulsion to wage no wars at all, if there 
were not such things as just wars. A just war, moreover, is 
justified only by the injustice of an aggressor; and that injustice 
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ought to be a source of grief to any good man, because it is human 
injustice. It would be deplorable itself, apart from being a source 
of conflict.”29   
Religious motivation not withstanding, Jefferson’s 
motive for subscribing to this concern was two fold. First 
by applying traditional Christian doctrine and teachings to 
the American situation he appealed to a mentality and way of 
thinking engrained in the moral and subconscious character 
of the vast population, both in America and Europe. This 
provided a common thread to link many different groups of 
people behind a common understanding and interpretation of 
the events transpiring in the American colonies. Second, it 
provided a supplementary basis for the notion voiced by 
Jefferson that fighting a strictly defensive campaign was 
just and rational. Not only was this type of conflict more 
pure and exalted, but it also represented the bare minimum, 
militarily, needed to preserve the natural order and rights 
of an oppressed citizenry. Jefferson placed a great deal of 
emphasis on national pride and honor. This type of military 
operation provided a noble and just non-aggressive aspect of 
armed resistance. For as Augustine explained, “… victory can 
be mortally poisoned by pride,” and, if the outcome of the 
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war is to provide peace, then it has accomplished the sole 
positive outcome war can achieve.30 
Overall, Jefferson saw war as a limited instrument to 
achieve specific ends. He recognized that it was an 
extension of human nature and if that were the case, it too 
could be placed under control with reason and logic. In this 
manner he was willing to argue that wars were necessary, 
lawful, just, and even useful in the scheme of nature. Given 
the rhetoric necessary to incite the colonies into armed 
rebellion against England, it was required that a conscious 
and morale approval mechanism for war be disseminated 
through the revolutionary propaganda. This philosophy seemed 
to foretell the military philosophies later argued by 
strategic thinkers Carl von Clausewitz and Baron Henri de 
Jomini. Having themselves come from the same Enlightened 
education as Jefferson, they developed similar ideas about 
the nature of warfare. Jomini, like Jefferson, argued that 
war was an integral part of civilization. Being a true 
disciple of the 18th century notion of warfare, he believed 
that through laws and reason, the destruction that resulted 
from war could be kept at a bare minimum. By restricting the 
aims of war to the destruction of the enemy force at the 
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coveted decisive battle, damage inflicted upon the 
infrastructure and populous was kept at a minimum. 
Clausewitz was of similar opinions but his concept and 
notion of warfare transcended many of the eighteenth century 
limitations. In a way, Clausewitz presents himself as being 
much more pragmatic than either Jomini or Jefferson. 
Clausewitz argues that “War is a mere continuation of policy 
by other means,” and that “All wars may be regarded as 
political acts.”31 In doing this he does not limit the scope 
of war to limited fashion seeking only the decisive victory, 
or to strategically defensive combat seeking only to 
preserve the status quo. Rather, Clausewitz argues that 
there is a realm in which the notion of total warfare is 
needed. This principle of waging unrestricted warfare upon 
the citizenry of a nation itself was in stark contrast to 
Jefferson and Jomini. This “diversity in the nature of wars” 
expressed by Clausewitz argues that “the greater and more 
powerful the motives of war, the more they affect the whole 
existence of the nations involved.”32 In essence the more a 
warring faction has to gain or lose as a result of combat 
will dictate the level and scope to which they will wage war 
on an enemy. If the aims of warfare are limited and 
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specific, as Jefferson tended to argue, then so will the 
level and intensity of the combat. However, if the goal is 
for the preservation of the state or the complete 
destruction of an enemy state, then the realm of combat must 
permeate through all levels of that society. By presenting 
arguments for both styles of warfare, Clausewitz and his 
doctrines have superceded those of Jomini and Jefferson, and 
are still studied to this day.33 
Commerce 
Jefferson wished to place an ideological check on the 
reliance of war to solve all political disputes. He argued 
that although war had its purpose, and was useful, it was 
the measure of last resort. As explained earlier, the ideal 
government Jefferson envisioned was the agrarian based 
republic. He envisioned no large industrial urban 
populations, which would represent an immoral and self-
absorbed corruption in the ideal society. As such, Jefferson 
was adamantly opposed to production except to the level of 
providing the new nation with required manufactured goods. 
Jefferson felt that the only other acceptable alternative to 
farming as a profession was that of an occupation on the 
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ocean. This idea he did not come at alone but rather from 
his responsibility to reflect and honor the wishes of the 
people.  
He wrote to John Jay in August 1785,  
“… We now have lands enough to employ an infinite number of people 
in their cultivation. Cultivators of the earth are the most 
valuable citizens. They are the most vigorous, the most 
independent, the most virtuous, & they are tied to their country & 
wedded to it’s liberty & interests by the most lasting bonds. As 
long therefore as they can find employment in this line, I would 
not convert them into mariners, artisans, or anything else. But our 
citizens will find employment in this line till their numbers, & of 
course their productions, become too great for the demand, both 
internal and foreign. This is not the case as of yet, & probably 
will not be for a considerable time. As soon as it is, the surplus 
of hands must be turned to something else. I should then perhaps 
wish to turn them to the sea in preference to manufactures, because 
comparing the characters of the two classes I find the former the 
more valuable citizens. I consider the class of artificers as the 
panders of vice & the instruments by which the liberties of a 
country are generally overturned. However we are not free to decide 
this question on principles of theory only. Our people are decided 
in the opinion that it is necessary for us to take a share in the 
occupation of the ocean, & their established habits induce them to 
require that the sea be kept open to them, and that that line of 
policy be pursued which will render the use of that element as 
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great as possible to them I think it a duty in those entrusted with 
the administration of their affairs to conform themselves to the 
decided choice of their constituents and therefore we should in 
every instance preserve an equality of right to them in the 
transportation of commodities, in the right of fishing, & in the 
other uses of the sea.”34 
This being the case, Jefferson hoped that the United 
States might serve primarily as a supply of natural 
resources for the industrialized nations of Europe. This 
followed the mercantile style economy that had existed in 
the colonies while under British control. Under this system 
Jefferson argued for no more a sea borne military than would 
be required to protect American shipping from pirates, in 
particular those along then Barbary Coast of Africa. A few 
naval vessels would be kept at sea to act as a deterrent to 
would be violators of American commerce and pride, while the 
rest would be maintained in ordinary, reducing cost, until 
they were needed by imminent war. Trade, Jefferson argued, 
should be free with all nations and not be obstructed by the 
politics or wars of belligerent nations. He hoped that the 
ever-present hostility between the European nations would 
provide vast markets for American goods, yet he hoped those 
                                                                                                                                              
accessed 4/7/03 
34
 Thomas Jefferson to John Jay, 23 August 1785. Letters. 818 
 32
nations’ sea going forces would not interfere with American 
neutrality and commerce.35  
Jefferson hoped this dependency on American commerce 
would provide the fledgling nation with an ideal weapon with 
which to exert policy upon European nations. He argued that 
if properly managed, the regulation or suspension of 
American trade to any major nation would be detrimental 
enough to that country’s economy to compel them to yield to 
American interest. With this weapon, only a sizable enough 
force with which to prevent limited acts of aggression on 
American shipping would be required. As he explained in a 
letter to John Jay, “…I think it to our interest to punish 
the first insult, because an insult unpunished is the parent 
of many others.”36 Essentially Jefferson hoped a small 
capable naval force would be adequate to deter or address 
any limited attacks upon American sovereignty upon the sea. 
Should this not be possible, and war erupt, he contemplated 
that it would be with one of the larger European nations, in 
particular England. He hoped that the commerce control 
mechanism, would serve as great a force in that country’s 
economy as a naval defeat would serve on the sea. At the 
same time, the lack of a large naval force would be less 
                                                
35
 Peterson. “Report on the Privleges and Restrictions on the Commerce of 
the United States in Foreign Countries”, December 16, 1793, p 116 
36
 IBID 819 
 33
likely to cause tension that could inadvertently lead to 
war.  
In summation Jefferson created and maintained a trinity 
between commerce, war, and debt. He did not fear or dislike 
war so long as it was on a limited scale and fought in a 
civilized eighteenth century manner. What he did oppose was 
national debt, which was the by-product of any war, 
especially with the creation and maintenance of a 
professional standing military complex. Of these, the navy 
represented the least cost effective and most likely to 
involve the United States in a foreign war. As he described 
in a letter to John Jay, August 23, 1785, “… (The navy) 
being the only weapon with which we can reach an enemy.”37 He 
was arguing in this letter, for the creation of a small 
naval force with which to defend national pride and honor, 
in direct response to attacks made upon American shipping by 
pirates. At the same time, it demonstrates his opinion that 
the navy is the only means with which to engage in an 
offensive posture with a nation. He feared that if the navy 
was constructed to large, that besides being too costly, it 
would present Europe with and excuse to engage in 
hostilities with America. 
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He labored extensively to prevent the burden of debt he 
saw the British taxpayer encumbered for, for the sake of 
maintaining her massive fleet. In doing so he developed the 
theory that through restricted commerce, not naval armament, 
peace could be maintained and enforced. This commerce should 
be tasked with moving primarily agricultural surplus, upon 
which he hoped other nations would depend. This would keep 
America morally superior by being agrarian based while at 
the same time he hoped an economic equilibrium would develop 
where, as dependant on foreign manufactured goods as the 
U.S. would be, so would they be to American agriculture. 
Jefferson hoped this would result in America and Europe 
policing their own home waters respectively. To explain this 
theory ideologically, Jefferson created the “Discrete 
Generation” theory, which essentially argued that one 
governing generation does not have the authority to incur 
debt, or laws, which will impact its posterity. This theory 
gave his fear of debt, and the resulting reduced military 
expenditures, philosophical and political legitimacy.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
MARITIME AND NAVAL STRATEGY 
 
 
 
  Before a discussion can take place on what an effective 
maritime strategy is, it must first be defined.38 Maritime 
goes beyond naval strategy in that the latter primarily 
focuses on issues dealing with preservation of the battle 
fleet, its logistics for operation, and strategy for 
success. The end to all of this is what is principally the 
militant side of maritime strategy. Beyond the navy is the 
regulation and preservation of commerce, lines of 
communication other than strictly military, the protection 
of the population, the protection and maintenance of the 
interior lines of communication, and trade with which 
imported and exported goods are transported.39 
 Alfred Thayer Mahan was a Captain in the United States 
Navy in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
In 1890 he published The Influence of Sea Power Upon History 
1660-1783. This work, along with others he published, became 
regarded as the definitive works in the arena of naval 
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warfare and strategy. His thesis that an effective navy was 
the cornerstone for every major world power was received 
greatly by naval proponents all over the world. In America, 
his work helped change the traditional stigma of anti-naval 
sentiment so prevalent in the American military mentality. 
As Mahan explained there are two principle reasons why a 
nation would wish to pursue a navy. “The necessity of a 
navy, in the restricted sense of the word, springs, 
therefore, from the from the existence of a peaceful 
shipping, and disappears with it, except in the case of a 
nation which has aggressive tendencies and keeps up a navy 
merely as a branch of the military establishment.”40 First 
and foremost a naval arm’s primary purpose is to protect the 
sea borne commerce of a nation state. The sea serves as a 
vast open highway through which materials, either raw or 
processed, may be transported in the most efficient manner. 
Its relative lack of natural obstacles to limit travel 
hinders the ability to strategically mass forces with which 
to protect commerce.41 As a result, in order for a state to 
protect its interests abroad, a mobile and effectual force 
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must be maintained with which to travel and respond to 
incidences of violence committed against commerce.  
 Second, a navy may be created and maintained for the 
principle use as a weapon of conquest if the intentions of 
that state warrant it.42 Few examples can be provided of this 
sentiment in the strictest use of the definition. Most 
nations capable of mounting a fleet for this purpose also 
have commercial fleets they wish to see protected. The most 
direct examples are states with a primarily piratical sense 
to their foreign policy. Examples of this sort are numerous, 
the most well known to American historians being the Barbary 
pirates in the Mediterranean. Their principle use of naval 
force was for the purpose of harassing merchant ships and 
making profit from tribute paid to them by nations for not 
committing acts of piracy. In essence instead of having a 
navy to protect their commerce, they generated revenue by 
being paid by other nations not to attack shipping. Paying 
this tribute, many nations argued, was cheaper than arming 
and dispatching naval forces to deal with the acts of piracy 
being committed. 
 For obvious reasons, the first scenario for the 
justification and need and establishment of a naval arm will 
be the one discussed and used here. For the early part of 
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American history, it was a matter of national mentality that 
a Republic would not wish to conquer. Incidentally, the 
means to do it were not present at such an infantile 
technological and logistical level of maturity. This being 
in mind, the next concept to be reviewed will be the forms 
of naval and maritime implementation. In essence there are 
two aspects that manifest maritime defense; ships and 
defended harbors. Each of these topics will be addressed in 
its respective chapter, but the underlying strategic nature 
of the two will be discussed here. 
First, ships are the direct tactical force-projecting 
implements of naval power. They constitute that aspect of 
naval strategy that is designed to project forward from 
protected bases and inflict damage upon an opponent.43 
Although apparently an offensive weapon, in that they are 
designed to go forward from a nation over distances and take 
the war to the enemy, this is only a limited description of 
what there larger scope and purpose is. Fleets serve 
strategically as a defensive weapon in that they are 
designed to go forward and protect commercial shipping and 
homeports for the continued operation of the fleets. In this 
sense no matter how tactically offensive the actions may be, 
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they are still strategically defensive in that they serve as 
the first layer of defense for the national, commercial, and 
economic security of a state. So long as the purpose of the 
navy is to engage an opposing naval force or commerce then 
that role is defensive. As soon as that fleet is tasked with 
the responsibility of attacking and invading an enemy’s 
country its role changes to essentially an offensive role. 
In this scenario the fleet becomes the engineering platform 
of the construction and utilization of new bases of 
operations, and the general disruption of the infrastructure 
of another nation. 
 Second, adequate harbors and their fortifications 
although defensive in nature, in reality serve the opposite 
role. For all practical purposes they serve as the strategic 
offensive weapon for the nation, for without secured home 
bases, navies cannot function. Mahan states that the most 
important strategic goal of a naval force is to ensure the 
protection and preservation of commerce, but also lines of 
communication. If it were not for adequate harbors, interior 
lines of communication, and transportation necessary for the 
continued movement of goods and information throughout the 
interior of a country, then a naval force would not be 
warranted. The defense of harbors by the force-projecting 
navy, in conjuncture with coastal and harbor defenses, 
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serves as a defensive measure for the strategically 
offensive goal of maintaining commerce and communication. As 
Mahan explained: 
“The offensive strength of a seaport, considered independently of 
its strategic situation and of its natural and acquired resources, 
consist in its capacity: 
1. To assemble and hold a large military force, of both ships of 
war and transports. 
2. To launch such force safely and easily into the deep. 
3. To follow it with a continued support until the campaign is 
ended.”44  
 
If these represent the fundamental elements and 
initiative for a naval arm, it must also be explained what 
principle factors affect the sea power of a nation. Mahan’s 
doctrine promotes six key factors that play a pivotal role 
in the creation of an effective militant maritime force. 
These factors are categorized as: I. Geographical Position. 
II. Physical Conformation, including, as connected 
therewith, natural productions and climate. III. Extent of 
Territory. IV. Number of Population. V. Character of the 
People. VI. Character of Government.45 The first three 
criteria are elements of physical characteristics of a 
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state, whereas the latter three reflect the nature of the 
people that collectively form the nation state.  
Physical characteristics and geography of a state 
furnish the foundation for which a people will either be 
inclined or hindered from pursuing a naval arm. The actual 
geographic position plays the largest role of these aspects 
for various reasons. First, if a state is situated so that 
it is not threatened by invasion from land, or is pressed to 
invade by land, or is any other way compelled to maintain a 
large standing army, then it possesses a possible naval 
advantage over an adversary that must contend with these 
issues. The necessity for a state to divert funds and 
resources to many different facets of warfare limit the 
overall potential of each branch. Few nations have the 
resources and manpower to adequately maintain both armies 
and navies of dominating power. Second, the position of a 
state may be such that it allows for the concentration or 
dispersion of forces. Either of these elements could be 
either advantageous or detrimental. France for example has 
access to both the Atlantic and the Mediterranean, which 
would at first glance provide a strategic advantage of 
placement. Upon closer review however, her two separate 
fleets can rarely operate in joint operations due to their 
required transit through the Straights of Gibraltar, a 
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strategic bottleneck controlled by enemy forces. For the 
U.S. in the early 19th century, the large commercial 
activities conducted in both the north and south required 
lines of infrastructure on the scale of many two shored 
European nations. Strategically, it could have been 
disastrous if it were not for the abundant resources in the 
country and an effective infrastructure. America’s great 
distance from major military forces provides a natural 
protection for its infrastructure. Third, the proximity of 
an enemy with which to launch raids against her commerce. 
Commerce raiding by nature defuses naval forces thereby 
requiring closer bases of operations for logistical 
purposes. By having ports in close proximity to an enemy, 
rapid and disastrous assaults upon an enemy’s commerce can 
be conducted with a limited amount of exposure for 
retaliation.46 
The second condition conducive to the establishment of 
a naval force is physical conformation. These are the 
characteristics of the shoreline. First, if a country has an 
extensive shoreline but no adequate harbors, being deep and 
well protected, then extensive commerce and a navy are not 
likely. Also, if a nation has sufficient resources to supply 
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the population, then they are less inclined to take to the 
sea to acquire more.47 
The third physical condition is the extent of territory 
upon which a nation is placed. The factor significant here 
is not so much the square miles encompassed within national 
boundaries but rather the length of its coastline and the 
character of its harbors. A long seacoast can be a strength 
or weakness depending upon the size of the population 
encompassed within it. Viewed in this light, a country 
resembles a fortress in that its garrison must be adequately 
proportional to the area being defended.48 
The next set of criteria deal with the social aspect of 
maritime defense. The first of these, population, has 
already been eluded to in discussion of extent of territory. 
Here though, another step is taken in evaluation beyond 
merely an adequate number residing in the state. Beyond 
population is the percentage that takes to the sea. At the 
minimum, what must be considered is the number of those who 
are at least readily available for deployment upon the sea 
and for the manufacture of material needed for naval use.49 
Second, the national character and desire of a nation 
to engage in maritime trade are a pragmatic necessity with 
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regards to the establishment of a maritime force. If we 
accept Mahan’s thesis to be true, that sea power is based 
upon peaceful and extensive commerce, then the character of 
a nation to be actively involved and prosperous in this 
endeavor is paramount. If the primary avenue for the 
acquisition of wealth is through commerce, as opposed to 
other means, then the nation demonstrating that 
characteristic will have an advantage. To illustrate this in 
a real world sense Mahan used England, France, and Spain as 
examples. France he argued relied more on thrift and 
hoarding of wealth to secure it, whereas Spain sought her 
riches from exploiting the gold and silver mines discovered 
in the new world. England on the other hand sought her 
fortune as shopkeepers making profits strictly through trade 
and commerce, which resulted in a dependency on an efficient 
naval and commercial structure far surpassing the other 
nations.50 
The final aspect that serves as a key to naval 
development is the character of the government. Particular 
forms of government are more supportive of the development 
of maritime authority. Given the republican form of 
government practiced in the United States, if it is the will 
of the people to have maritime commerce, then it is the 
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responsibility of the representative government to act upon 
these wishes. In a letter already quoted in this work, 
Jefferson argues that if it were his decision, he would not 
have the people of the new republic pursue the occupation of 
seafarers, but he said it was not his decision to make 
because it was his responsibility to reflect the desires of 
his constituency. Essentially, governmental influence acts 
in two ways, the first of which is during peacetime. Policy 
can promote the expansion of peacetime commerce and trade 
thereby increasing the attachment of the people and the 
economy to the sea, or it can attempt to promote industries 
that inhibit this expansion. The windfall of this either 
creates a need for a navy or reduces it. Ironically this is 
was not the situation the United States found itself in 
during the War of 1812. Commerce had developed by natural 
means, but the navy had been hampered by actions of 
governmental policy. The result being the United States was 
ill prepared for a naval war.51 
This leads to the second influence the government may 
have over the navy, during times of war. It is the 
responsibility of the government to ensure that in the event 
of war, provisions, men, and armament are of sufficient 
quantity to provide protection for the merchant fleet. As 
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mentioned earlier, this is the role in which American failed 
prior to the War of 1812.52 Beyond the measures taken at home 
to prepare a navy for war, it is also necessary for naval 
stations abroad to be prepared for forward deployment of 
fleets. As such, three vital links have been established 
through which a government can promote maritime endeavors: 
promotion of an active peacetime commercial trade, creation 
and maintenance of a sufficient naval force and arms as to 
protect the merchant fleet in times of war, and the creation 
of forward bases for the distribution of the fleet beyond 
the range supported by only domestic ports. As shall be 
demonstrated, the maritime defense policy adopted by 
Jefferson and the Republicans supported only one of these 
three links. This set precedence for maritime inadequacy for 
most of the first half of the nineteenth century. 
As an addition to this cursory evaluation of maritime 
strategy, the infancy of the American government should be 
evaluated. To provide a contrast, the study of maritime 
policy in antiquity illuminates the limits of what role 
naval power can develop at the level of political and 
economic maturity analogous to the situation facing America 
at its inception. As Chester Starr points out, “…the 
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deliberate exercise of sea power depended upon the rise of 
firm political units with sufficient resources to support 
navies.”53 Thus, a “thalassocracy” requires political and 
economic systems that can consciously aim at naval control 
of sea lanes for the transport of useful supplies and also 
of armies toward that end.”54 Neither of which the U.S. 
possessed at its inception.  
Mahan’s doctrine argues what measures should be taken 
by a nation in order to secure dominance both politically 
and militarily, upon the sea. Its primary purpose is to 
argue the strategic need and impact of an effective naval 
force for victorious nations throughout history. The 
guidelines he argues are vital and have been proven correct 
in many ways by the study of historical events. Mahan’s 
thesis is nonetheless directed at political entities with 
much more maturity than the U.S. had at the time being 
evaluated here. What Mahan’s doctrine does provide is an 
explanation as to why the U.S. suffered such defeats 
politically and militarily in the early republic. This in 
turn explains a great deal about the political and social 
actions taken by the government during these years. 
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This is not to serve as a defense or apology for the 
policy that was pursued by Jefferson but rather a side note 
to aid in explaining the complex situation through which he 
developed his policies. Two principle notions are now at the 
heart of this evaluation: 1. The U.S. did not have the means 
to secure a naval supremacy on the high seas, or even the 
capability with which to fight on equal terms her European 
adversaries with any hope of success. 2. The U.S., by 
following the Jeffersonian maritime defense policy, severely 
limited and crippled what resistance it could have fronted 
against foreign threats. The consideration of what Mahan 
argues and what was actually possible requires a balance of 
moderation, which seems to be the key.55 
Jefferson’s Strategy 
 
As has been explained already, Jefferson’s economic 
plans for the country all but excluded any significant 
military, especially a navy. Although there is little doubt 
that the nation did not have the resources to create and 
maintain and large naval force, the strategy and design of 
the naval forces possible were inefficient at best. What is 
argued here is that the resources available were not 
adequately harnessed and developed by the government under 
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Jeffersonian policy. The question here is not whether the 
perfect and adequate naval force could be created to rival 
the insults delivered by the Royal Navy, but whether the 
best possible, given the means available, could have been 
adopted to better prepare the U.S. for the defense of such a 
large commercial force. 
In the event of war, Jefferson favored a strictly 
defensive campaign. In a letter to John Jay on August 23, 
1785 Jefferson states, “If a war with England should take 
place, it seems to me that the first thing necessary would 
be a resolution to abandon the carrying trade because we can 
not protect it. Foreign nations must in that case be invited 
to bring us what we want & to take our productions in their 
own bottoms.”56 This illustrated clearly Jefferson’s intent 
upon using the refusal of trade with nations as a weapon of 
coercion, as opposed to combat. Yet in the same letter he 
explains, “Indeed I look forward to the very possible case 
of war with an European power, & I think there is no 
protection against them but from the possession of some 
force on the sea.”57 What can be derived here is that 
Jefferson recognized the need for some naval force with 
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which to secure a defensive measure against possible 
European belligerents. 
In this sense, Jefferson envisioned a purely coastal 
defensive naval arm with which to defend the nation. 
American commerce he intended to defend by halting and 
allowing transport of goods only upon vessels belonging to 
nations seeking trade.58 This he felt would protect American 
merchant men from attack and impressment while at the same 
time protect the American taxpayer by having the burden of 
defense for shipping paid by whatever nationality chose to 
export American products upon their own vessels. The 
Republicans simply tried to build their strategy around what 
they considered the most effective use of national 
resources, without the dangers of violating their principles 
regarding the expansion of the national debt. It is very 
possible that Jefferson adopted this rather uniquely 
defensive naval mindset from the French, for whom he had 
affection. They developed a strictly frugal and defense 
oriented strategy governing the deployment of their fleet, 
in stark contrast to Great Britain.59 
The test bed for my hypothesis, that the Jeffersonian 
maritime defense policy was a failure, will be the tension 
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that existed between England and the U.S. during Jefferson’s 
administration. My hypothesis is two fold: First, his 
reliance on economic persuasion to prevent war failed; 
second, with the onset of war with the Madison 
administration, the American navy proved ineffectual. Basic 
naval strategy having already been summarized, I will now 
lie out the general strategic policies of Jefferson citing 
examples. This analysis will come in two parts, first the 
use of economic measures and second the designed use of 
Jefferson’s navy. 
The strategic maritime offensive weapon under 
Republican ideology, i.e. one that is designed to sway the 
opinion and actions of belligerent European nations, was the 
regulation of the American commercial force. This maritime 
policy had two modes of implementation. First, the use of 
economic coercion in the form of a temporary embargo on 
American export that served as a defensive precautionary 
policy.60 It was designed to withhold American ships, 
sailors, and mercantile property from the world’s oceans in 
an attempt to keep them out of harm’s way.61 Second, a total 
embargo of all exports and imports served as the offensive 
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tool of economic persuasion.62 This effectively banned the 
importation of foreign goods by congressional law, and the 
exportation of all American goods on any vessels, not just 
those flying the Stars and Stripes. Essentially these two 
systems were designed to influence foreign attitudes toward 
American sentiment prior to the last option of war being 
used; with a limited embargo preventing the export of 
American goods on American vessels, and a total embargo 
reflecting a policy of non-intercourse with the intent to 
starve into submission a political adversary. 
From its beginning, the United States experienced 
antagonism upon the high sea from various European 
belligerents and the Barbary pirates in North Africa. The 
Republican doctrine of free commerce upon the sea set the 
stage for a fleet of unprotected wealth laden ships, ripe 
for the picking. The instability in Europe that had begun 
with the wars of the French Revolution escalated into the 
Napoleonic wars. When neither England nor France could 
achieve decisive victories, they turned to the sea and began 
attacks upon the commerce of noncombatant nations with the 
hope of hindering trade, and thus the war effort of each 
other.  
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Elected in 1801, Jefferson’s first term as President 
was focused on the elimination of the national debt, 
restoration of republican principles, and the purchase and 
exploration of the Louisiana territory. However, the issues 
brought on by the wars in Europe dominated his second term 
as well as the presidency of his successor. The intensity of 
the war in Europe began to escalate after 1805. This led to 
a change in priorities in the American government. The 
British escalated the practice of impressment of American 
sailors to supply their manpower needs in the expanding 
wartime navy. It had grown from roughly 36,000 men in 1792 
to over 120,000 in 1805. It was estimated that the British 
between 1803 and 1806 had impressed 2,798 men.63 The response 
from Jefferson and the Republicans was the experimental use 
of commercial coercion on a much greater scale than had ever 
been attempted. Many variations were tried including the 
Non-Importation Act of 1806.64  
Many factors combined to create the tense political 
atmosphere, which led to the embargo. In particular was the 
Leopard/Chesapeake affair. On June 22, 1807 the United 
States frigate U.S.S. Chesapeake set sail for a cruise to 
the Mediterranean. Waiting off of Norfolk was the British 
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frigate, HMS Leopard, with orders to seek out the American 
frigate and search her for British deserters. When the two 
ships made contact, the Chesapeake heaved to and took on a 
lieutenant from the British ship. With him was a copy of the 
orders to search for deserters and a note from the captain 
of the Leopard expressing his desire for peace to be 
maintained. After a period of debate in Commodore Barron’s 
cabin aboard the Chesapeake, the British officer returned to 
his ship with word that the Americans would not cooperate. 
After an exchange of words through the hailing trumpets, the 
Leopard fired a warning shot across the bow of the 
Chesapeake with no effect. The Leopard then moved into 
position and proceeded to bombard the American frigate with 
broadsides for about ten minutes. Barron surrendered and a 
second boarding party was sent aboard the Chesapeake, where 
the crew was mustered and four members were taken off and 
placed upon the Leopard.65  
The response in America was swift and unified, the 
public demanded satisfaction. All throughout Virginia, 
patrols of militia kept a watchful eye on the British 
squadron and prevented the ships from getting supplies. All 
over the nation acts of retribution were enacted wherever 
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possible. In New York an English ship had its rudder and 
rigging removed by an angry mob, and all over the country 
public meetings denounced the act against the Chesapeake. 
The cry for war against Britain rang loud throughout the 
nation. Initially Jefferson tried to damper this emotion and 
keep it short of open flame. He hoped the outcry of protest 
from the citizens would be enough to compel England to 
settle the whole affair and perhaps even compel them to 
cease impressments.  
Jefferson immediately set about writing the governor of 
Virginia urging restraint of actions that may limit the 
options available to the Congress by the time of their next 
session. Jefferson also issued a proclamation closing off 
all American ports to British warships. This satisfied the 
need for some type of action while at the same time limiting 
the amount of contact between the populous and the British. 
Jefferson wished to avert any serious action until the 
Congress could meet, thus giving time for tempers to settle 
and most importantly allowing time for American merchantmen 
to return to their home ports with little fear of being 
captured by British warships. 
As time progressed, and Jefferson continued to receive 
reports regarding the actions of the British squadron 
stationed off of Hampton Roads, his demeanor became more 
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agitated. The news he received from England was less than 
optimistic and soon he and his cabinet were discussing 
possible modes of war and an invasion of Canada. Diplomatic 
missions to London were unsuccessful and by October, 
Jefferson knew that public demand would not be enough to 
sway England from her policy of impressment.66  
As he explained in his Eighth Annual Message on 
November 8, 1808:  
“The Communication made to Congress at their last session 
explained the posture in which the close of the discussion relating 
to the attack by a British ship of war on the frigate Chesapeake 
left a subject on which the nation had manifested so honorably and 
sensibly. Every view of what had passed authorized a belief that 
immediate steps would be taken by the British government for 
redressing a wrong, which, the more it was investigated, appeared 
the more clearly to require what had not bee provided for in the 
special mission. It is found that no steps have been taken for that 
purpose. On the contrary, it will be seen, in the documents laid 
before you, that the inadmissible preliminary which obstructed the 
adjustment is still adhered to; and, moreover, that it is now 
brought into connection with the distinct and irrelevant case of 
the orders in council.”67  
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Congress, in return, allowed the Non-Importation Act to 
go into effect and supported the President’s decision to 
close off American ports to many British goods and her 
warships. Reaction from the leadership in Britain and France 
with regard to actions taken by both sides on the high seas 
was so dismal that a response to a letter James Monroe sent 
to Jefferson regarding the dispatch of another special 
session in 1809, earned this reply:  
“The idea of sending a special mission to France or England is not 
entertained at all here. After so little attention to us form the 
former, and so insulting and answer from Canning, such a mark of 
respect as an extraordinary mission, would be a degradation against 
which all minds revolt here.”68  
At this point Jefferson was merely trying to delay 
hostilities with England until America could prepare and her 
merchant fleet could be recalled. Jefferson was horrified at 
the abandonment of limited warfare in favor of the large-
scale battle fought by Napoleon leading to the slaughter of 
so many Frenchman. Jefferson feared that any public mention 
of war or preparation for it might insight England to wage 
war upon America before she could prepare. In the end, this 
ambitious adventure failed to solve America’s commercial 
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problems and she was forced to adopt more dramatic measure 
as the only way to achieve her political goals.69 
It was the Embargo of 1807 that so drastically proved 
the futility of a coercive commercial plan. Not only was it 
unsuccessful, it effectively served to prevent the growth of 
a capable American naval arm and all but ruined the 
country’s economy. Jefferson hoped that with the prevention 
of importation of English goods, American industry would be 
strengthened through self-reliance. He also hoped that the 
lack of the American commercial fleet would stagnate the 
English economy. In actuality the total embargo resulted in 
decreased American production and with the absence of 
American commerce, all but created a monopoly of shipping 
for the English merchant fleet. 
On December 22, 1807, Jefferson signed the Embargo Act 
into law.70 The chief aims of the embargo were precautionary 
and coercive. Jefferson figured that the embargo coupled 
with the Non-Importation act would all but result in British 
imperial starvation. Critics claimed that the same could be 
said for an American starvation as a result of the new 
embargo. Key to the success of the embargo was the almost 
unanimous support of it by the people, both to enforce self-
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denial and to make it clear to the British the U.S. would 
carry out the embargo as long as was necessary. 
The public sentiment soon began to reveal chinks in the 
armor of the great economic experiment. Jefferson had 
effectually waited too long after the Chesapeake to enact 
the embargo. British hatred and resounding patriotism had 
begun to diminish. Violations were rampant and the 
government could not enforce the law in all ports 
simultaneously. Many loopholes in the law were used to allow 
shipping, a by-product of its broad definition when signed 
into law.  
By the fall of 1808, the failure of the embargo was 
obvious. Its purpose as a coercive tool had failed due to 
bad timing and poor implementation. Had the government been 
able to hold on, the embargo may have proven of limited 
success, for early in 1809 England appeared to be 
reconsidering the importance of trade with America. 
Jefferson and the Republicans had drastically over estimated 
the reliance of Great Britain upon American goods as well. 
In 1808, only 12 million pounds of cotton reached England 
from America, which was a drastic drop from the 44 million 
pounds, imported the year before. Other foreign markets 
quickly stepped up to fill the demand and imported over 30 
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million pounds that same year.71 Poor regulation, lack of 
popular support, and an expanding international market that 
could fill the void left by American withdrawal undermined 
the pressure that could have been exerted by this form of 
economic control. 
The results of the embargo were varied. On the domestic 
front, economic stagnation was rampant. Sailors seeking 
employment left for service on British ships, ironic 
considering the role involuntary impressments played in the 
coming about of the embargo. Industry, projected to increase 
production with a reduction in imported processed goods, saw 
a decrease in production. National unity was damaged as a 
result of political questions that arose from the embargo. 
Sectionalism between North and South increased as economic 
issues and political ideologies continued to butt heads. 
Most importantly however, it provided an excuse for the 
continued neglect of the American military system. With the 
failure of peaceful economic coercion, it left only military 
options as a way to sway English policy. 
Strategic Analysis 
Throughout the course of this chapter accepted naval 
strategy and purpose has been outlined, as has Jefferson’s 
strategic policy involving maritime use. His inability to 
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abandon eighteenth century notions of warfare, long after 
the rest of the world had done so, led to his adoption of a 
devastatingly ineffective policy. Two very distinctive flaws 
in his strategy have been demonstrated here. 
First, Jefferson hoped to use peaceful economic means 
as his principle way of exerting influence on belligerent 
nations. As Mahan explains on the first page of The 
Influence of Sea Power Upon History, “The history of Sea 
Power is largely, though by no means solely, a narrative of 
contests between nations, of mutual rivalries, of violence 
frequently culminating in war.”72 In the course of human 
actions, the exertion of force and policy becomes a 
necessity in a social environment. Extend this to include 
groups and societies, and the guidelines remain relatively 
the same. When dialogue and incentives are not enough to 
convince another to act in accordance with our wishes, it is 
left to physical means to serve as the medium of influence. 
The ultimate human activity analogous to this is warfare. 
War is the implementation of politics by other means.73 To 
rely on any other measure of influence is not necessarily 
foolish, for no other means may be available. With this 
understood, victory should not be expected. Although 
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Jefferson understood the merits of war in a limited sense, 
his reliance upon non-military means as the strategic way in 
which to exert will, negated the basic and proven mode of 
enforcement, war. 
Second, Jefferson had two principle policies governing 
the navy that proved ineffectual. He hoped to maintain only 
an adequate enough naval force to provide limited 
capabilities on the high seas to defend honor. Essentially 
he argued for a limited notion of maritime warfare, and 
should this prove unsuitable against some adversaries, he 
could rely on commercial control to influence the will of an 
opponent without violent means. The reliance upon gunboats 
and the strategic use of the navy being purely defensive was 
in direct opposition to Mahan’s strategic doctrine. This 
doctrine states that the use of a navy to serve expressly as 
a passive defensive force rules out its principle aspect, 
its mobility to attack and defend far from the shores that 
it is defending.74 This doctrine manifested itself in his 
reliance upon small gunboats for an inexpensive naval force 
relegated to defense. This aspect will be analyzed greater 
in the following chapter.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
THE NAVY AND JEFFERSON 
 
 
 
  Naval forces constitute one leg of the military aspect 
of maritime strategy. This aspect of maritime policy was 
most impacted by Jefferson’s policy. Under the Republican 
ideology that dominated American politics after the 1801 
election, the navy was the most drastically reduced military 
establishment. The defensive coastal gunboat navy adopted by 
Jefferson severely crippled the nation’s ability to protect 
its investments upon the high sea and led to a naval 
inferiority to other maritime nations. 
The Creation of the Navy Under the Federalists 
 Under Federalist control, the American government took 
great strides in the creation of an active naval arm. 
Between 1792 and 1801 the U.S. created a naval force, the 
bureaucracy to govern it, and actively participated in two 
naval deployments. First was the Quasi-War with France.  
America sought to stop, by force, French vessels that were 
attacking and harassing American shipping. This conflict saw 
the rapid mobilization of American naval power. Second, was 
the series of campaigns against the Barbary pirates. 
With the end of the American Revolution, the remnants 
of the Continental Navy were either scrapped or sold at 
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auction. Given the authority granted the Federal Government 
under the Articles of Confederation, finances for 
establishing any form of combat arm were unattainable. In 
1789, the United States Constitution went into effect 
creating a new federal government with broader powers. Many 
of these new powers dealt specifically with the creation and 
preservation of a national naval force. Since gaining its 
independence from Great Britain, American merchant ships, no 
longer protected by the British navy, were raided by 
corsairs in North Africa. The new Constitution was written 
with these issues in mind. Article I, Section eight, number 
ten of the Constitution tasks the government with the 
responsibility to maintain a navy; Article II, Section two 
decrees that the President shall serve as Commander in Chief 
of the Army and Navy of the United States.75 
 Despite the provision in the Constitution, the nation 
did not have a navy because the means to create one were not 
readily available. By 1790 the situation in the 
Mediterranean had escalated. Secretary of War Henry Knox 
began to research the cost of creating and maintaining an 
adequate force to deal with the Barbary problem.76 His report 
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to Congress in 1791 argued for ships of 44-guns, which 
constituted a balance to the largest known ships in 
possession of the corsairs at the time.77 The Congress 
however was of the opinion that a naval militia was adequate 
and actively endorsed the shipbuilding trade of the merchant 
and fishing fleets. It was widely believed that in the event 
of belligerency these vessels could be fitted out for 
privateering, saving the money needed to construct a navy. 
Privateering and commerce raiding, it was felt, would 
destroy enough commerce to cause an opponent to yield to 
American interests. 
 At the end of the eighteenth century, the coast of 
North Africa was controlled by series of military 
dictatorships located in Morocco, Algiers, Tunis, and 
Tripoli. These regions were agriculturally inefficient and 
had no significant commerce. The leaders relied upon piracy 
to supply the national treasuries, which supported their 
lavish individual lifestyles. Exacting tribute from nations 
in an agreement not to assault their shipping was a common 
practice, as was kidnapping and kidnapping fraud.78 Algiers 
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was the dominant of the corsairs. Using techniques 
reminiscent of the Romans in the First Punic War. The 
pirates would come along side an enemy ship and drop great 
planks over an enemy’s rail. Attached to the end of these 
planks were massive iron spikes that would embed themselves 
in the victims’ deck. This would effectively secure the two 
vessels together. They would then use these massive secured 
planks as bridges to ferry men across and commandeer their 
prey.79 
Thomas Jefferson, while serving as Ambassador to France 
and later as Secretary of State, was of the opinion that war 
should be waged against the corsairs. He felt that national 
honor demanded a response and by paying tribute in return 
for “protection” from piracy showed a sign of weakness that 
would later cause the nation more trouble with nations 
abroad. From the beginning he argued for a naval force with 
which to defend national honor. Jefferson wrote vehemently 
to Congress supporting the establishment of a naval arm that 
he argued would be no more costly to construct and maintain 
than it would be to buy peace from the Algerines.80 Despite 
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these pleas, Congress would take no drastic action in 
creating a navy in 1790-91. 
The Naval Act of 1794 
Late in 1793, President Washington brought to Congress 
a report from the Secretary of State on the measures taken 
to secure peace and ransom of Americans being held captive 
by the corsairs. The matter came up as a result of increased 
hostility from the Dey of Algiers. The result of the 
President’s report and Congress’s ensuing discussion was the 
passage of the Naval Act of 1794. This act created the 
United States Navy and was signed into law by Washington on 
March 27, 1794. It appropriated the funds necessary for the 
creation of a naval force. Its purpose as written in its 
preamble was to protect American commerce from the 
depredations of the Algerine corsairs.81 
The act was composed of nine sections that laid out the 
mechanism and composition of the new force. It was to be 
composed of six vessels, four to carry forty-four guns each, 
and two to carry thirty-six guns each. The number and types 
of officers to be employed on the vessels was laid out, as 
was the number of sailors required for each vessel. Pay and 
food rations for the officers and men were included along 
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with the provision allowing the President to purchase ships 
so long as the number of vessels did not exceed the six 
provided for. Of great importance was the final section, 
which stated; “Provided always, and be it further enacted, 
That if a peace shall take place between the United States 
and the Regency of Algiers, that no farther proceeding be 
had under this act.”82 This last provision echoed the opinion 
of the Congress that the navy should be only a temporary 
institution designed to respond to specific threats. The 
navy created under this act was expressly that a small force 
designed and constructed with a specific mission in mind. 
The law having been passed meant the Secretary of War 
had to find some way to build a fleet for which no practical 
experience in the new country had yet been achieved. Knox 
set out to gather shipwrights who may be able to design the 
new vessels. Eventually, Joshua Humphreys and a young 
English designer by the name of Josiah Fox were tasked with 
the responsibility of designing the new American warships.83 
They decided upon frigates as the type of vessel to be 
constructed. It was decided that four 44-gun ships would be 
constructed at yards in Boston, New York, Philadelphia, and 
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Norfolk. The two 36-gun ships would be constructed at 
Portsmouth, New Hampshire and Baltimore.84 In addition to the 
location, size and number of vessels to be built, so to were 
their names decided; Constitution, United States, President, 
Constellation, Congress, and Chesapeake. 
 Eighteenth century naval warfare revolved around the 
wind powered sailing ships-of-the-line. Ship-of-the-line was 
the classification given to warships that were of sufficient 
size to be included in the standard naval battle formation 
of the period, the battle line. They were constructed of 
wood, preferably oak, and were classified as “Rates”.85 Oak 
was very strong and resilient, and when properly dried 
before use, would serve a long time before beginning to rot. 
The Rate classification had six levels, only the first three 
were considered suitable to serve in the line. A “first 
rate” ship of the line was armed with up to one hundred guns 
and a “second rate” ship was armed with ninety to ninety-
eight guns. These were the super heavies of naval warfare, 
and though few in number they generally served as the 
flagships and demonstrated more than any other symbol the 
power of a nation. The standard class of fighting ship was 
those of the “third rate”. These ships were armed with 
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sixty-four to eighty-four guns. These ships had two gun 
decks and were much more maneuverable and cost effective 
than the larger warships. “Fourth rate” ships were armed 
with fifty to sixty guns and “fifth rate” ships were armed 
with 30 to forty-four guns. Normally in between the “fifth 
rate” and the “sixth rate” classes were the frigates. 
Frigates mounted between twenty-eight and forty guns mounted 
on one gun deck. They were small fast and maneuverable. They 
were the most glamorous warships of the time and were 
relatively powerful for their size. The smaller ships of the 
“sixth rate” mounted between twenty and twenty-eight guns.86  
 The American frigates took the shape of a single 
decked warship and exhibited excellent sailing 
characteristics. They were armed more heavily than regular 
frigates, and by all measures were regarded as super-
frigates when compared to those maintained by other nations. 
They were as long as vessels intended to mount seventy-four 
guns and they were designed to carry 24-pound long guns 
instead of 18-pound long guns.87 The reasoning behind their 
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design stemmed from the vast numerical superiority that 
almost every other nation had over the U.S. in any possible 
naval engagement. American ships were designed to be more 
than a match for any ship of comparable size. They were 
designed to be able to stay at sea for long periods of time 
and perform well in naval slugging matches. They had good 
sailing characteristics and speed so they might control the 
time of engagement to when it best suited them. The ability 
to fight or flight in combat is a formidable advantage and a 
necessary survival skill. For this reason they were designed 
to outrun anything they could not outfight. 
When compared to vessels in other navies, what the 
American lacked in numbers they made up with in quality. 
British frigates of the 1790s were mostly twenty-eight and 
thirty-two gun ships displacing roughly six hundred to one 
thousand tons. The larger British frigates that faced the 
American’s in the War of 1812 were significantly weaker as 
well. The American frigates were the strongest fifth-rates 
on the seas. The forty-fours displaced over 1,576 tons and 
were armed with thirty 24-pounder long guns on the deck and 
twenty-two 42-pounder carronades on the quarterdeck and 
forecastle. The thirty-sixes displaced 1,287 tons and were 
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designed to carry twenty-eight 18-pounders on the gundeck 
and twenty 32-pounder carronades on the quarterdeck and 
forecastle. This increase in firepower was the result of two 
factors. First, the increased length of the ship allowed 
more gunports to be mounted. Second, they were designed with 
a wider and stronger spar deck that was able to act as a 
secondary gundeck. Normally the gangways on either side of 
the ship that allow transit above the crowded gundeck would 
not have supported the weight of additional guns. The 
frigates also possessed great defensive strength in the live 
oak wood construction that was far superior to the wood used 
in English vessels.88 
Before these design characteristics could be put to use 
and tested, the Dey of Algiers signed a peace treaty on 
September 5, 1795. According to the Naval Act of 1794 work 
upon the ships was to have stopped with peace having been 
secured. Washington, being a supporter of naval expansion, 
fashioned a compromise that in the name of public interest 
work on the three ships most advanced toward completion 
would not be stopped. The three ships completed were the 
Constitution at Boston, United States at Philadelphia, and 
the 36-gun Constellation at Baltimore. The first of these, 
                                                
88
 American State Papers, Naval Affairs, Vol. 1, p 38. 5th Congress, 2nd 
Session, 1798. Accessed online at National Archives http://lcweb2.loc.gov 
9/2/02 
 73
the United States slid down the ways on May 10, 1797, the 
Constellation on September 7, and the Constitution on 
October 12.89 
The Quasi-War with France 
The catalyst that prompted Washington and the 
Federalists to act for preservation of the fleet and gave 
their argument enough legitimacy to warrant the Republican 
compromise was the growing hostility faced by neutral 
nations upon the seas. As a result of the French wars of 
revolution and the resulting Napoleonic wars, Europe was 
embroiled in war from 1793 until 1816. This warfare spread 
from the battlefields and battle fleets to the realm of 
commerce. England and France both attempted to disrupt the 
commerce in and out of each other’s ports. Neutral states, 
like the U.S., bore the brunt of this aggression upon the 
high seas. The signing of Jay’s Treaty between America and 
Great Britain in 1794 was viewed by France as a violation of 
the treaties America had signed with her.  
It was under these circumstances that John Adams was 
elected to the presidency in 1796. On March 2, 1797, the 
French directory renounced the principle of “free ships make 
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free goods”.90 In this renouncement, French privateers and 
men-of-war had the right to pursue and board American 
vessels and require a roster of all men and their 
nationalities on board. The French ship could then legally 
capture American vessels failing to have such a list. 
Having never enforced this rule, most ships failed to 
have it, nor were they given time to get it. The act took 
effect immediately, essentially declaring all American 
shipping not in homeports to be fair game for French attack. 
Seeking a diplomatic solution, President Adams dispatched 
John Marshall, Elbridge Gerry, and Charles Pickney on 
October 4, 1797, to secure a peaceful solution. The 
resulting X.Y.Z. Affair aided in creating the additional 
political atmosphere necessary to propagate pro-naval 
sentiment in the nation.91 
America responded with the Naval Act of July 1, 1797, 
which enabled the President to complete and man the three 
frigates nearing completion.92 Of the over 5,000 American 
commercial vessels at sea in 1797, three hundred were lost 
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to French activities. U.S. imports fell from $81,000,000 to 
$75,000,000; exports from $67,000,000 to $51,000,000.93  Such 
losses were threatening an economic downturn in the U.S. On 
May 28, 1798, Adams signed a bill entitled “An Act more 
Effectually to Protect the Commerce and Coasts of the United 
States." It extended a limited amount of war powers to the 
Presidency. Adams used it to order American warships to 
recover captured American vessels and to engage French ships 
which had committed acts of depredations, or intended to.94 
By the end of June 1798, the three American frigates were 
almost completely fitted for sea. They were supplemented by 
an assortment of converted merchantmen, making the American 
Navy set to clear the costal waters and begin actions 
abroad.95 
The strategy America employed against France changed 
over time as the navy developed and grew. Initially, the 
navy was a purely defensive force. American warships were 
restricted to the waters close to American ports, tasked 
primarily with patrolling for French privateers and 
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warships. Convoy duty for American merchant ships traveling 
up and down the American seaboard was also common practice. 
During this critical time, American crews and captains were 
able to get acquainted with their new vessels and establish 
daily shipboard routines in relatively safe waters.  
The Navy Department and an Offensive Force 
In response to the increasing naval situation and the 
likelihood that the size and complexity of management of 
naval affairs would soon become to large for the Secretary 
of War to maintain, the new cabinet position of Secretary of 
the Navy was created. The first man to actively discharge 
this position was Benjamin Stoddert who would hold the 
position from June 18, 1798, until April 1, 1801.96 Under his 
direction the navy would finally have and administrator 
whose sole task was the improvement and establishment of an 
effective naval arm. He sought to create a navy that would 
be able to securely defend American commercial interests 
abroad as well deter belligerents from assaulting America 
itself. 
Stoddert and the rest of the Federalists worked to 
increase the size of the navy as quickly as possible. On May 
28, 1798, Congress instructed American warships to attack 
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any French vessel near American waters that was suspected of 
having intent to harass American commerce. This act formally 
instigated the Quasi-War with France. The conflict’s 
conclusion saw the new American Navy grow to include fifty-
four ships of various sizes. Realizing the time needed for 
construction of new ships was too great, Congress set about 
purchasing vessels and converting them into warships as a 
stopgap navy to supplement the frigates. In fact the first 
American warship to set sail was the Ganges on 24 May 1798. 
She was a former merchantman purchased by the government for 
$58,000 and armed with twenty-four cannon.97 Within a short 
period, the government purchased eight merchantmen to 
supplement the frigates coming into service. They mounted 
anywhere from eighteen guns to twenty-four. When compared to 
the later frigates constructed and commissioned in 1799, 
such as the John Adams 28 and Essex 32, it can be seen how 
comparatively large these vessels were and how vital their 
introduction was.98 Of the twenty-two ships in service with 
the United States Navy in 1798, eight were former 
merchantmen, eleven were small revenue cutters pressed into 
service, and of course the three frigates.99 Frigates may 
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have served as the backbone of the navy, but it was the 
smaller vessels that served as the muscle. 
The increasing demand for patrolling cruisers and 
escort vessels for American convoys spurred new construction 
programs. Despite the length of the hostilities, practically 
all new construction of ships was done between 1798 and 
1799. During this time the construction and purchase of new 
vessels was of the utmost importance to the Navy Department. 
At the end of 1797, three ships were in service with the 
navy. On July 16, 1798, Congress approved the completion of 
the last three frigates originally provided for in the Naval 
Act of 1794.100  The Congress, 36 was launched at Portsmouth 
on August 15, 1799, the Chesapeake, 36 at Norfolk on 
December 2, 1799, and the President, 44 at New York on April 
1, 1800.101 By the end of 1798 the navy had grown to twenty 
ships, and by the end of 1799 thirty-three. Of these, five 
were 44’s, four were 36’s, seven were 32’s, three were 24’s, 
seven were 20’s, four were 18’s, and three were 14’s. Nine 
galleys and eight revenue cutters supplemented these blue 
water vessels.  Also constructed were two 28-gun frigates 
and three smaller ships of twenty to twenty-four guns. For 
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coastal and harbor defense, two schooners and seven galleys 
were also built.102 
In addition to these vessels, the merchants of some 
major ports constructed five new frigates. Though most were 
completed too late to be of any use in the Quasi-War, they 
would prove to be useful in later naval activities. The 
frigates commissioned as a result of this effort were: the 
Philadelphia, New York, Essex, Boston, and John Adams. The 
Philadelphia was a thirty-six constructed at New York and 
was the largest of the frigates constructed by private 
subscription. Her action and destruction at Tripoli account 
for some of the most daring exploits in naval history. The 
New York was the second largest frigate constructed in this 
manner, also at New York. Also rated as a 36-gun ship, she 
was slightly shorter than the Philadelphia. She spent much 
of her life laid up in ordinary at Washington Navy Yard and 
was scuttled when the British attacked the city in 1814. 
Third, was the famous Essex. A large 32-gun frigate, she was 
constructed at Salem, Massachusetts from funds collected in 
Essex County. She would go on to glory in the War of 1812 as 
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a commerce raider in the Pacific. She was ultimately 
captured by the British frigate Phoebe, 36, and the sloop 
Cherub, 18. The Boston was a smaller 28-gun frigate 
constructed at Boston and was responsible for the capture of 
the French frigate Berceau on October 12, 1800.103 After this 
episode she was placed in ordinary at the Washington Naval 
Yard and allowed to rot until she was burned in 1814. The 
smallest frigate built by subscription and presented to the 
Navy was the John Adams, constructed in Charleston, South 
Carolina. The small 28-gun frigate saw very little active 
life and remained in ordinary, allowed to rot until her 
break up at Norfolk in 1829.104 
The hostilities with France provided America with the 
first victories and defeats for her navy. Three French 
warships were captured during the war, the schooner Bon 
Pere, the 36-gun frigate L’Insurgent, and another small 
frigate the Berceau. The latter of these vessels was 
returned to the French but the former two were pressed into 
American service under the names Bee and Insurgent 
respectively.  
Between 1799 and 1800, American activity against the 
French saw its climax. During these years the United States 
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conducted extensive operations in the Caribbean. Stoddert 
dispatched what forces he could to the Caribbean for the 
winter months. This prevented the ships from being bottled 
up by ice and harsh weather off of America’s north Atlantic 
coast. An American force that averaged no more than fifteen 
ships captured eighty-six French privateers.105 American 
vessels operating out of these foreign ports in the area 
achieved most of these victories. Only one American warship, 
the Retaliation, was lost due to enemy actions.106 
The Quasi-War with France was a success for the United 
States as well as the navy. Stoddert had proven his worth as 
an administrator and leader. With minimal staff he had 
managed to fight political pressure and the national fear of 
a military long enough to win significant clout for the 
United States and her new Navy. He had created a small but 
reputable force that proved its capabilities against the 
most formidable of European belligerents. In keeping with 
his character, Stoddert formulated a proposal to Congress 
that included an expansion plan for the navy he felt would 
provide security from any aggressor. On February 25, 1799, 
Congress passed a Federalist bill of great importance for 
the navy. It had three significant measures. First, funds 
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were appropriated for the construction of six 74-gun ships. 
These vessels would have been America’s first heavy enough 
to be considered ships-of-line. Second, $50,000 was 
allocated for the construction of two naval docks for 
repairing naval vessels. Third, it appropriated $200,000 for 
the purchase of timber or land upon which timber was 
growing.107 Stoddert argued for forces that could compete in 
large naval engagements with European forces. However, his 
advocacy for the selling of smaller vessels in order to 
prevent the diverting of funds from his impending battleship 
fleet was shortsighted. Numerous times during the Quasi-War 
smaller vessels of the schooner size were of shallow enough 
draft to pursue lesser warships close to shore for capture. 
Frigates and vessels of larger size were suited for blue 
water operations and patrolling but not for pursuit of 
vessels into coastal waters. A balance of small coastal 
ships and large blue water vessels was necessary to provide 
an effective naval arm capable of handling any maritime 
threat. 
On February 3, 1801, hostilities with France ceased 
with the signing of treaty. Naval expenditures were no 
longer at the forefront of American concerns. One of the 
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last measures of the Federalist government was the “Peace 
Establishment Act” on March 3, 1801.108 In order to save as 
much of the enlarged navy as possible, the fleet was 
voluntarily cut down from thirty-three vessels to thirteen. 
Stoddert pressed for these thirteen to be the frigates and 
recommended the selling of the smaller vessels. 
Jefferson and the Mediterranean Squadrons 
Thomas Jefferson assumed the office of President on 
March 4, 1801.109 He brought with him a new administration 
and a new economic policy for the nation. His primary 
mission was to end large government expenditures and 
decrease the national debt. One of the first targets for 
restructure and downsizing was the navy. The success and 
national pride the navy had obtained during the limited war 
with France had helped give itself definition. The navy 
would not be eliminated as it had after the Revolution. Due 
to pragmatic needs of the navy when dealing with the Barbary 
Pirates, several new vessels were constructed while 
Jefferson was president. As Jefferson was being sworn in, 
threats in the Mediterranean were once again rising. The 
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navy would be reduced but it would still be expected to 
serve the new administration’s policies as well as it had 
the predecessor’s. 
Fearing that ocean-going warships may engage the young 
republic in another war with a European power, Jefferson 
opposed the creation of more vessels with those credentials. 
By the end of 1801 the new construction facilities began by 
the Federalists were either liquidated or made inoperative. 
Preparation for construction of the 74-gun ships was halted 
and all materials collected for them were ordered into 
storage. The proposed sites for new naval yards served as 
the storage houses for these provisions. Many of these naval 
stores were not properly attended to and eventually 
succumbed to rot and disrepair. Under the “Peace 
Establishment Act” the President was allowed to sell all 
vessels in the navy with the exception of the thirteen 
frigates. Seven of these were scheduled for ordinary while 
six were to be kept on active duty but with reduced crews. 
Jefferson’s primary goal was to establish a frugal and 
efficient government. He decreased the over three million 
dollar 1800 Federalist naval budget to just under one 
million dollars in 1801.110 
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Besides selling vessels and discontinuing construction 
and personnel, Jefferson also devised ways to save money 
maintaining the fleet he was forced to endure. One of his 
most ambitious programs was the creation of a massive dry 
dock. He planned an enormous covered dry dock with the sole 
purpose of providing a location for frigates to be stored 
out of the water and protected from the elements. This he 
envisioned would allow vessels to be placed in storage with 
no crew yet be immediately called in to service in a perfect 
state of readiness. He felt this system would save money in 
both repairs and personnel.111 Plans were drawn up and 
locations selected but Congress did not approve and it was 
never constructed. 
On May 17, 1801 the Pasha of Tripoli, Yusuf Karamanli 
declared war on the United States. He felt the amount of 
tribute being paid was insufficient. Six days later the 
first American squadron was dispatched by Jefferson to the 
Mediterranean. The United States had not yet received the 
declaration of war but reports of the Pasha’s actions had 
already incited much displeasure within the U.S. During the 
Quasi-War, the United States frigate George Washington had 
the less honorable task of transporting tribute to the Dey 
of Algiers. While in port offloading his cargo the Dey 
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requested that the vessel be used to transport an ambassador 
and gifts to the sultan of Constantinople. After much debate 
the American captain agreed to serve as a courier service 
given the fact that his ship was alone, without support, and 
under the guns of the harbor. The mission was made all the 
more distasteful given the amount of luggage, human cargo, 
and animals required given the diplomatic nature of the 
mission.112 Needless to say this was not the appropriate 
assignment for an American man-of-war. Upon return to 
America, the story presented angered most and helped spur 
Jefferson into action. 
On May 20, 1801, Jefferson dispatched a squadron that 
was far more formidable than what the Barbary corsairs were 
accustomed to. Instead of a small lone frigate, Jefferson 
dispatched the President 44, Philadelphia 36, Essex 32, and 
the schooner Enterprise 12. With the exception of the 
Enterprise, the ships of the squadron were too large to 
affect a successful blockade. Their large size and deep 
drafts prevented them from getting close enough to shore to 
prevent small vessels from entering. The Enterprise was the 
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only vessel to make a capture during this first deployment, 
capturing a Tripolitan 14-gun ship.113 
This squadron was relieved by a second, which sailed on 
March 10, 1802. Being the only small daft vessel to escape 
the auction block, the Enterprise was again assigned along 
with the Constellation 36, New York 36, Adams 28, and the 
John Adams 28. Once again this force was not suited for 
operations against small fast vessels in shallow water. 
While capturing and destroying a few vessels, the blockade 
was still largely ineffective.114 
Observing the lack of success, it was decided that 
changes were in order. On February 28, 1803, Congress passed 
an “Act Pertaining to the Navy” which authorized the 
construction or purchase of four smaller vessels not to 
exceed sixteen guns.115 It was decided that two brigs and two 
schooners would be added to the fleet. The 16-gun brigs were 
to be constructed at Philadelphia and Boston and the two 
schooners at Baltimore. Secretary of the Navy Robert Smith 
directed three naval officers to oversee construction of the 
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vessels and to construct them for suitable service in the 
Mediterranean. The two brigs were named the Argus, 16 and 
the Siren, 16 and were both completed and sent to the 
Mediterranean in late 1803. Of the two schooners, one was 
constructed and one was purchased due to time constraints. 
The schooner constructed was named Vixen, 12 and was 
commissioned on June 25, 1803. The purchase schooner was 
renamed Nautilus, 12 and sent to the Mediterranean in 
1803.116 
These four new ships were assigned to a new squadron 
under the command of Edward Preble. Preble in command of the 
Constitution, 44 had with him the Philadelphia, 36 as well 
as the new vessels and the Enterprise, 12. It was this 
mission that reached the Mediterranean on September 13, 
1803, that would prove to be the most successful, glamorous, 
and costly. On October 31, 1803, Captain Bainbridge of the 
Philadelphia sighted a ship trying to slip into the harbor 
at Tripoli. Having just dispatched the Vixen he alone was in 
position to act. He gave pursuit and his frigate ran hard 
aground on an uncharted reef. All attempts to lighten the 
vessel enough to float off the reef failed, and after attack 
by Tripolitan gunboats and unable to return fire, Bainbridge 
surrendered in order to save lives. The three hundred-seven-
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man crew was captured and imprisoned. Unfortunately a few 
days later a storm freed the Philadelphia and she was 
captured and brought into the harbor at Tripoli.117 
Preble, shocked by the events, developed a bold plan to 
destroy the frigate and prevent her use by the corsairs. 
Using a captured Tripolitan vessel, re-christened Intrepid, 
Lieutenant Stephen Decatur along with 80 volunteers, 
infiltrated the harbor and set fire to the Philadelphia on 
February 16, 1804. Decatur and his men escaped with only one 
injury and succeeded in destroying the Philadelphia and 
providing the navy with a new hero. As a result of his 
actions, Decatur was promoted to the rank of Captain at the 
age of twenty-five.118 
After this incident, American actions toward Tripoli 
increased in intensity. From the Kingdom of Naples, Preble 
received six gunboats and two bomb ketches, as 
reinforcements after the loss of the Philadelphia. With this 
increase in numbers, attempts were made to bombard the city 
into submission with little effect. Five separate times 
American naval forces bombard the city with little response. 
Finally on March 8, 1805, four hundred Arabs and seven U.S. 
Marines made a land assault on the city of Derna and 
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captured it.119 As a result of the pressure from land as well 
as sea and the increasing effect of the American blockade, 
Pasha Yusuf Karamanli signed a peace treaty with the U.S. on 
June 3, 1805.120  
Jefferson and the Gunboat Navy 
The largest naval increases made by Jefferson were for 
the construction of small gunboats. Jefferson hoped that a 
large force of small coastal gunboats stationed at American 
harbors would be sufficient to defend American soil when 
properly coordinated with coastal defenses. This idea, much 
like the “dry dock”, was designed to provide security at a 
minimal cost. These small vessels could be stored on land 
under cover, protected from the elements and maintained in 
perfect state of preservation until they were needed.121 
Under the Federalist navy, seven small galleys were 
constructed for harbor defense. The navy manned and put the 
boats to sea but they proved to be of little value and were 
removed from naval service in 1801-2.  
In 1800, Secretary of the Navy Stoddert wrote that in 
his opinion one 12-gun schooner on the naval establishment 
was worth a thousand galleys for naval service under the Act 
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of May 4, 1798.122 Despite their military record in the 
service of the United States navy, Thomas Jefferson 
envisioned these small relatively inexpensive vessels as the 
backbone of the American coastal defense navy and the 
salvation of the American military debt expenditures.123 
Citing opinions from General Horatio Gates, Commodore 
Thomas Tingy, and Commodore Samuel Baron, Jefferson provided 
supporting evidence for this type of vessel.124 Under the 
same act that led to the creation of the Argus, Siren, 
Vixen, and Nautilus, fifteen gunboats were created for 
harbor defense. Congress allocated funds for the 
construction of twenty-five in 1805, fifty in 1806, and one 
hundred eighty-eight in 1807.125 In 1807, Secretary of the 
Navy Robert Smith estimated that it would require two 
hundred fifty-seven gunboats to protect American ports along 
the Atlantic and in New Orleans.126 Of this number, only one 
hundred seventy-six were ever constructed. They proved to be 
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rather expensive to maintain and many were constructed of 
green wood and were prone to rot quickly.  
The gunboats themselves varied in style form place to 
place. Having no single designer placed the style of the 
vessels in the hands of the local shipwright. Most were 
around sixty feet long and armed with one or two large guns, 
24-pounders or 36-pounders. Secondary armament usually 
consisted of small swivel guns. Some had a single gun 
mounted forward and some had one mounted fore and aft. A few 
designs even show double mounted cannon on a rotating 
platform in the center of the craft.127 
The War of 1812 
With the assumption to the office of the Presidency by 
James Madison on March 4, 1809, little changed with regards 
to the navy. A follower of Jefferson, Madison was not 
inclined to alter much from the previous executive’s naval 
agenda. Given the increased hostility demonstrated toward 
American shipping and the impressments of sailors by the 
British during his administration, it is curious to note 
that naval expansion was not actively pursued in the U.S. at 
this time. The U.S. had fought an economic war against the 
British since the Chesapeake/Leopard Affair of June 22, 
1807. As the War of 1812 approached the gunboat program 
 93
began to lose its momentum with its largest supporter no 
longer in office. By 1811 the only vessels under 
construction were those gunboats that had been ordered at an 
earlier date but were not yet completed. Many of the once 
proud ships in ordinary had been allowed to rot and most 
still in service were in need of extensive refit and repair. 
The navy yards that were maintained had become little more 
than storage facilities for rotting naval stores. For a 
nation whose economic policy had been designed to be 
defensive and based upon regulatory measures to combat the 
largest naval force in the world, the lack of preparation of 
naval arms was not surprising.128 
The only active vessels at sea in 1812 were the sloop 
of war Wasp and the small brigs Enterprise, Vixen, Syren, 
and Viper. In New York a fully-manned and ready squadron 
comprised of the President, United States, Congress, Hornet, 
and Argus was waiting. America had seventeen seaworthy 
ships: nine frigates and eight smaller vessels. This is in 
contrast to the 1,048 in the Royal Navy of which one hundred 
twenty were ships-of-the-line and one hundred sixteen were 
frigates.129 In the war plans developed, the navy was not to 
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put to sea. It was to be totally a land campaign against 
Canada from which Great Britain was procuring the majority 
of raw supplies needed to support her navy.130 However, the 
disarray of the army and the time required to organize and 
train the militia allowed the navy enough time to prepare a 
few vessels for war.  
The best strategy to employ the forces was debated. 
Some argued for large squadrons patrolling the seas in 
force, while others argued for lone cruisers acting 
independently in search of British ships. Between June 21 
and August 29, the New York squadron under the command of 
Commodore John Rodgers patrolled for British shipping in the 
North Atlantic with little result. After this attempt it was 
decided to abandon the strategy of squadron operations in 
favor of single cruises or occasionally in groups of two or 
three.131 
For the fist year of the war, American victories at sea 
were impressive. Practically all of the ship-on-ship duals 
fought between the American vessels and British ended in 
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American victories, in particular were three frigate-to-
frigate engagements. This was due in large part to the needs 
of the British navy to keep close to home for defense 
against Napoleon or kept at sea protecting more vital 
commerce in its far-flung empire. When the Royal navy began 
to seriously invest in the American conflict, the heyday of 
the American Navy quickly came to a close. Much of the navy 
became bottled up in port unable to leave. Only a few 
vessels were actively engaging the British at sea after 
1813. The most notable of these was the pacific cruise of 
USS Essex. 
She escaped into the Pacific and single handedly 
destroyed the British whaling industry there. The economic 
injury inflicted upon the British trade throughout the first 
ten months of the war quickly dwindled as well. Once the 
British navy became organized and redistributed its forces 
to the American conflict, the American navy proved 
ineffectual at best.132 
Beginning in 1813 the blockade of the American 
coastline became more organized and effective. The Royal 
Navy began to raid along the coast in an attempt to further 
disrupt American commerce and trade. This type of warfare 
was exactly what the gunboats were designed to defend 
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against. When confronted with the large men-of-war that 
accompanied the British forces, the small craft were forced 
to retire to escape destruction.133 
The War of 1812 resulted in a rude awakening for 
American political thinkers regarding national defense and a 
navy. First, the organized British convoy system that 
developed after 1812 put and end to the belief that cruiser 
and privateers alone could inflict enough commercial damage 
to prevent an effective naval operation of an enemy. Second, 
the reliance upon a defensive-based maritime strategy was 
inadequate to protect American interests. The war 
demonstrated the inadequacy of gunboats to prevent attacks 
on the American coast. At the same time, reliance upon these 
craft took away resources and attention from construction of 
vessels that may have been able to put to sea and prevent a 
British blockade. The blockade paralyzed the American 
economy and the American military machine. Had enough small 
ocean going vessels been available to harass merchant 
shipping and thereby force more British warships into convoy 
duty, then possibly the U.S. could have adopted a naval 
building campaign that could have produced ships of 
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significant size and number to counter the available British 
forces dispatched to contend with them. 
 98
CHAPTER 5 
 
THE MYTH OF COASTAL FORTIFICATIONS 
 
 
 
 The second leg of armed maritime defense is embodied in 
coastal and harbor emplacements. Since the inception of the 
Untied States Government, the threat of a hostile invasion 
by foreign powers was at the forefront of military concerns. 
From the beginning of the use of gunpowder, artillery, and 
cannon, few military principles were as monolithic as 
superiority of guns ashore over that of guns afloat. The 
reliance upon wind for propulsion in the large warships of 
the period severely limited maneuverability, placing them at 
a great disadvantage when engaging fortified stationary 
shore positions. This principle was adopted whole-heartedly 
Thomas Jefferson as the most logical and economical defense 
option. It became widely accepted that a system of defensive 
fortifications at each of the important harbors would be the 
cheapest and most pragmatic way to defend the new nation and 
her commerce from overseas threats.134  
 The persistent fascination with coastal fortifications 
stems from many factors. First was the financial status of 
the fledgling American nation. The mythos of the American 
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anti-military sentiment is rooted in pragmatic issues as 
well as idealism. Many of the founding fathers did fear the 
threat of a professional military force because it was 
through military force that strong centralized governments 
in Europe had been able to maintain control over their 
populous. A more practical explanation was the financial 
requirements of a military force in the emerging national 
economy. As idealistically perfect as a citizen army may 
sound to some, its significantly reduced price tag was 
appealing to even more. 
 It was under this opinion that Jefferson and the 
Republicans worked in opposition to a navy. As expensive as 
an army is to maintain, a navy is a much greater drain on 
resources. The Naval Act of 1794 proposed navy of four ships 
of 44-guns each and two ships of 36-guns each, but by April 
30, 1798, only three of the frigates were completed at the 
extravagant cost $305,420.135 Armies are much easier to 
maintain because they can more easily support themselves off 
the land and require less pay. They are easy to disband and 
reform as threat requires, so that during peacetime 
budgetary expenditures can be greatly reduced. According to 
the militia mentality, a very cheap and small professional 
army could be maintained that in the event of invasion could 
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work in conjuncture with the militia and act as a delaying 
force until a temporary army could be raised to force out 
the invaders. This theory relied very heavily on the vast 
distance between the U.S. and European belligerents as a 
deterrence and time saving weapon in the grand American 
defense policy.  
A navy on the other hand required large expenditures of 
money even during peacetime. Crews had to be continuously 
maintained and trained to keep themselves and their ships in 
fighting trim. Ships themselves were a terrible economical 
burden to maintain because they were so susceptible to the 
harsh corrosive environment of the sea. Also, the possession 
of a small conventional land force is much less threatening 
to an overseas empire than a force projecting naval arm. 
Jefferson hoped that by maintaining no more of a militant 
maritime force than required for defense, i.e. coastal 
fortifications and a shallow water gunboat fleet, that no 
military threat could be accidentally perceived.136 This it 
was hoped would eliminate one more reason for a European 
belligerent to open hostilities against the US. 
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 The policy of American fortification construction and 
design will be analyzed in this paper at a greater length 
than the Navy simply because this facet of Jefferson's 
defense policy was embraced for a longer time than was his 
naval policy. Whereas the in-depth study of the navy ended 
with the War of 1812, the issue of fortification will be 
carried out through the Civil War. It was this conflict that 
proved to be the death null of the Jeffersonian notion of 
coastal defense. 
Background 
 
 The general rule in colonial America was defensive 
works were small, primitive, irregularly garrisoned open 
earthen works mounting a few small cannon. These 
generalizations held true for defenses on the interior 
frontier as well as the seaward facing forts. The 
imperialist European powers saw no need to construct large 
permanent fortifications in frontier territories because 
their primary goal was to protect colonists from attacks of 
Indians. The only times large permanent fortifications were 
constructed along the same lines and quality as those found 
in Europe was when they were to protect areas from attacks 
by other European colonies that had the skill and ability to 
wage a European style war or siege. The notable examples of 
this rule were Castle Williams constructed in Boston harbor 
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and the formidable Castillo de San Marcos constructed by the 
Spanish in St. Augustine, Florida.137   
 Castle William was named for William III of England. It 
was a massive structure constructed of brick cemented with a 
mortar made from burnt oyster shells. Originally began in 
1689 with funds from England, it was modernized in 1740 and 
twenty 42-pound guns were installed on its walls. Its 
construction coupled with its armament of over a hundred 
guns easily made it the most powerful defensive structure in 
the English colonies. Its location was strategic in that its 
field of fire controlled the vital harbor at Boston. Castle 
Williams was captured by Americans in 1776 and occupied 
until its destruction in 1801 to make way for the 
construction of the new Fort Independence on the same island 
in Boston harbor.138 
 The Castillo de San Marcos is the oldest standing 
permanent European fortification in the United States. It 
stands today on the spot where several wooden forts had 
previously been erected. The location was chosen because of 
the natural harbor adequate for ships of the time and its 
proximity to the French Huguenots’ establishment at Ft. 
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Caroline, in what is now Jacksonville, Florida.139 It was 
Spanish policy that all land in the new world was property 
of Spain given to her by Papal decree. This encroachment by 
French Protestants was intolerable and demanded military 
action to remove them from sovereign Spanish soil, hence the 
origin of fortifications in St. Augustine.140 
 The fort as seen today is a masterpiece of 17th century 
defensive works. It is constructed of a material known as 
coquina, which is shell rock quarried from nearby Anastasia 
Island. The unique consistency of this substance and its 
elasticity proved very resilient to solid shot fired from 
ships. The British discovered this in 1702 when an 
expedition from Charles Towne failed to breech the walls of 
the fort after a lengthy siege.141 
 Both forts epitomized the linear progression of 
European fortress design. Fortifications like the Castillo 
de San Marcos are the by-products of middle ages' castle 
design and the lessons learned from the effect of siege 
weapons on the high walls of castles. Fortresses inshore 
were at the mercy of siege weapons. These pieces were very 
                                                
139
 Manucy, Albert. The Building of the Castillo de San Marcos. National 
Park Service Interpretive Series, History Number 1. Washington: 
Government Printing Office, 1961. p 67 
140
 Coker, P.C. Charleston’s Maritime Heritage 1670-1865. Charleston: 
CokerCraft Press, 1987. p 3 
 104
large and could be brought into close range of a fortress's 
walls. With enough proximity, even the inaccurate smoothbore 
cannon of the time could accurately target the same spot on 
the walls of a castle to affect a breech. For this reason 
fortress design began to change by lowering walls and 
placement of them behind earthen mounds to protect against 
direct fire.142 The necessity of keeping the walls of 
fortifications low limited the amount of firepower the 
fortress could bring to bear on any one target. The guns of 
a fortress now could only be mounted on the top of the 
exterior walls. Therefore, the number of guns was limited on 
any side by the fact that they had to be placed side by side 
on a single level of fire. The only way to increase this 
number was to extend the length of the walls, but even this 
had its limitation. As the walls grew longer, the angle of 
fire required for the gun to traverse for targeting 
increased to the point that not all of the guns could be 
brought to bear. This in addition to the required cost and 
engineering difficulty of constructing longer walls of 
defense meant that for the foreseeable future defensive 
works would remain relatively small. 
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 Armament of the time also had severe drawbacks for 
defensive works. During the colonial era cannon were 
generally of small size. By far the majority of artillery 
pieces in the colonies were of light size, generally 24-
pounders or smaller. A few larger pieces could be found in 
places like Castle William and the Castillo de San Marcos, 
but they were never larger than a 42-pounder.143 The size and 
range of artillery over the next century would require a 
great number of fortified locations and guns to adequately 
defend a strategic location.   
 Fortifications in the colonial era were mostly 
temporary earthen structures designed to be manned for short 
duration to respond to specific threats. The two notable 
examples that were permanent and well defensible were 
quickly allowed to fall into disrepair as the politics of 
Europe began to change and economic and military interests 
were directed more toward Europe itself. The armament and 
technology needed to improve the overall effectiveness of 
harbor fortifications would be increased greatly as a result 
of Jeffersonian ideals but not before a period of 
experimentation and national maturing would take place. 
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 In the early 19th century the U.S. managed to fortify 
thirty-five separate coastal locations from Canada to 
Georgia. By 1850 that number had decreased to twenty, by 
1900 it was down to sixteen, and by 1940 there were only ten 
permanent fortifications on the American Eastern seaboard 
between Maine and Savannah, Georgia.144 The decline in the 
number of coastal defenses in the late 19th and 20th 
centuries was as a result of fewer, yet more powerful guns 
that could cover a wider area with more accuracy. By 1900, 
only one heavy gun was needed roughly for every five 
emplaced in 1865.145 Also, the number of vital harbors 
diminished. As ships got larger, the number of ports in use 
for major maritime traffic declined because they were no 
longer adequate. The diminishing number of guns needed to 
defend a given area and the fewer number of vital strategic 
navigable waterways account for the decline of harbor 
defenses. 
Construction Programs 
 The fortification policy of the early Republic took 
shape in three basic forms as determined by the construction 
method and design characteristics of the fortifications. 
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Although there were three distinct building programs, many 
projects overlapped and many were completed during later 
construction periods. The first two construction periods 
were direct results of threats upon the U.S. by European 
powers. As such they were more hastily constructed with less 
planning and effort placed into their construction. So long 
as hostility was not perceived to be imminent, defensive and 
military concerns were not at the forefront of political 
concerns. The result was a limited appreciation for the 
future repercussions of a decaying military force for the 
immediate and shortsighted needs of the economy.  Peacetime 
military expenditures and mentality were ill prepared to 
cope with the larger concern of long-term economic and 
national security. This trend of disregarding the military 
in peacetime for short-term economic improvement was, and 
is, typical. 
The first construction period lasted from 1794 to 1807. 
It was divided into three different periods. The first 
occurred in 1794 as the threat of open European interference 
with American commerce increased. The second phase occurred 
in 1798 with the Quasi-War with France, and the third 
occurred in 1801 as a result of a resurgence of British 
antagonism on the high seas.  
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In 1807 the second fortification policy was drafted as 
a result of increased tension between the U.S. and Great 
Britain and in particular the Chesapeake incident of June 
1807.146 Few examples remain of these first two periods 
because the materials of which they were constructed. Many 
were constructed on good ground and were later destroyed to 
make way for newer defensive works. The third and final 
coastal defense policy that will be studied in this research 
was begun in 1817 and was unique in that it was the lone 
example that was undertaken under relatively peaceful 
circumstances with no imminent threat apparent. 
 The political climate in Europe deteriorated rapidly 
after the conclusion of the American Revolution. Most 
notably on July 14, 1789, the French Revolution began that 
that had unprecedented repercussions throughout Europe and 
the world.147 For purposes of consideration here, the 
relative turmoil in Europe in the 1790s prompted the House 
of Representatives in 1794 to convene a special committee to 
address the issue of locations and defensives that should be 
erected to provide for a defense of the U.S. On February 28, 
1794, the committee report on the expense required to place 
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the principle seaports and harbors of the United States was 
read by Mr. Thomas Fitzsimons a Represenative from 
Pennsylvania in the House of Representatives.148 It was 
estimated that it would cost $76,053.25 to erect the 
defensive works and another $96,645 to cast and construct 
the cannon and carriages needed to arm the forts. This 
included a list of the recommended defended seaports which 
were listed as follows: Portland, Maine; Portsmouth, New 
Hampshire; Cape Ann, Salem, Marblehead, and Boston all in 
Massachusetts; Newport Rhode, Island; New London, 
Connecticut; New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Norfolk, 
Wilmington, North Carolina; Ocracock Inlet; Charleston, 
South Carolina; and Savannah, Georgia.149 Within three weeks, 
on March 20, 1794, the first Federal authorization was 
passed for the construction of defenses on the U.S. coast.150 
 Due to the haste and need for the defenses, the 
Secretary of War issued only general design characteristics 
for the forts. For the most part, specific plans and 
logistics were handled by the local engineer. This trend of 
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leaving the majority of control and leadership of fort 
construction to the local state and municipality would be 
visible in the lack of defensive and architectural 
consistency in the individual forts. The result was little 
more than the rehashing of colonial era wilderness 
fortification. Most forts of the first series were open 
works with earthen parapets. Depending on the size and 
importance of the harbor, some defenses were armed with 
eight to ten guns up to several dozen. The bulk of armament 
lay on the vital seaward side, with only a few light cannon 
protecting the landward approaches, supplemented by a few 
defensives redoubts or blockhouses. With only a few 
exceptions, most were constructed simply of loose earth and 
covered with grass to prevent erosion. In areas where the 
soil lacked the cohesion necessary to support itself, timber 
and occasionally stone facing was used to front the walls. 
 French engineers drew up the design of most of the 
early forts. However, given that the land where they were 
constructed belonged to the individual states, all design 
proposals had to be approved by the local governors. The 
influence of these individuals and their subordinates led to 
many alterations from the original plans created. In 
addition to this, funds were sporadic and amounts varied 
from year to year. 
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With the deterioration of relations with France the 
government decided to allocate more funds in 1798, $300,000 
was allocated for defensive protection of the frontiers and 
$292,678 was allocated for maintenance and preservation of 
the Army.151 What works had been originally completed in the 
1794 program had quickly succumbed to the elements and were 
in dire need of repair. Of the first permanent fortification 
built under the United States Government, only two survive 
in a relatively unaltered state, these are Ft. Mifflin near 
Philadelphia and Ft. McHenry in Baltimore. Ft. Mifflin 
demonstrates the lack of cohesive design construction in 
that it features a star shaped wall system and incorporated 
into this a modified bastion design.152 In contrast to this, 
Ft. McHenry is a typical pentagonal shaped walled structure 
with an overly prominent bastion located at each of the 
points.153 The large bastions are characteristics of earlier 
single-tiered fortresses and would later be replaced with 
smaller multi-leveled bastions demonstrated in the second 
and largely third series of American defensive works.154 
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 Between 1800 and 1807, the issue of coastal defenses 
once again fell to the wayside of public concern and 
sentiment. Compounding this issue was the economic policy of 
the new President, Thomas Jefferson. Jefferson’s economic 
policy was focused on eliminating the national debt and 
decreasing national expenditures.155 During this time, no 
appreciable amount was allocated for the maintenance of 
existing structures or the construction of new ones. It was 
not until the Chesapeake incident on June 22, 1807, that 
Jefferson became significantly concerned with national 
defense to alter his opinion on funding for national 
defense.156 On July 2, President Jefferson proclaimed that 
all armed vessels of His Majesty’s Navy “now within in the 
harbors or waters of the United States, immediately and 
without delay to depart from the same.”157 Harbors were 
sealed off to British warships in American waters and those 
already in port could not receive servicing. The main 
irritation occurred around the lower Chesapeake Bay and the 
harbor at Norfolk, Virginia and Hampton Roads. 
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 The result of this event and the turning of Jefferson’s 
military agenda was the appropriation of over three million 
dollars for coastal defense for the next several years. This 
was by far the largest amount yet made available for defense 
construction. The program went into application rather 
quickly and between 1807 and 1812 a number of significant 
works were constructed in time for the War of 1812. The 
works of what would become known as the Second system were 
as a general rule more elaborate than those of the First 
System yet still lacked coordinated design and planning. 
Still present was a high degree of variation and local 
influence on design characteristics. Despite this continuing 
problem, it is significant to note that unlike the preceding 
design series that was designed by French military planners, 
the Second system was designed by led by engineers of 
American birth and training.158 
 Whereas the first system was limited by funds to open 
earthen parapets, the second system was more varied given 
additional capital. Works in the second system were 
comprised of three general types: open batteries, masonry 
faced earthen forts, and most importantly all masonry 
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forts.159 The open batteries constructed in the second system 
were basically the same as those in the first with the 
exception that they were used primarily as supporting works 
for more significant defenses constructed using more 
formidable construction methods.  
 The masonry faced earthen forts were the more numerous 
of the Second system style. They resemble the last of the 
First system defenses constructed. These structures are sub-
categorized into two architectural styles. The more common 
made extensive use of circular and elliptical lines in the 
construction of the external walls. Many of these forts had 
a regular pentagonal shaped system of exterior walls with 
circular shaped bastions utilized for defense. Few examples 
of these exist in their original state. Like most other 
forts of the first and second systems, they fell victim to 
major alterations or replacement by more significant works 
in the third system. The best surviving example of this 
style is Ft. Norfolk in Virginia, which was completed in 
1809.160 Its main armament was housed in a semi-elliptical 
battery and was constructed to replace a work constructed in 
the 1794 program.  
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 The other unique design style of the second system 
masonry faced earthen forts was a star shape. Many of these 
were updated first system works, which had there masonry 
fronts added later. Many of these were constructed with 
bastions, which were to provide overlapping arcs of fire to 
protect the exterior walls. A few were constructed without 
bastions relying on the angles created by the star shape to 
provide the same type of protective capability. The best 
example of this is Ft. Wood on Bedloe’s Island in New York 
harbor. This unique eleven-pointed specimen now serves as 
the base for the Statue of Liberty.161 
 By far the most significant and far reaching influence 
of the second system was the all-masonry fort. These 
structures would go on to influence fortification design and 
construction for the next fifty years. Most influential in 
this design was the casemated gun emplacements possible with 
high walled stone fortifications. As explained earlier, the 
length of the walls limited the amount of firepower 
deliverable because cannon could only be mounted on one 
level. The new design using arches and multiple levels could 
facilitate several levels of cannon, effectively increasing 
firepower exponentially while at the same time decreasing 
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the overall perimeter area covered by defensive walls. This 
also enabled defenders in a fort to stay behind a more 
secure series of defensives, protecting them from enemy 
fire. The multiple tiers of cannon placement effectively 
stacked the firepower of a fort in a manner similar to that 
of warships of the time.162  
 Construction of forts in this manner had since the 
inception of gunpowder been a taboo. High walled castles of 
the Middle Ages proved very ineffective against large siege 
artillery. Their masonry walls proved susceptible to 
artillery fire for two reasons. First was the consistency of 
stonewalls. When shot impacted the walls, the lack of 
elasticity in stone resulted in large amounts of damage when 
struck at high velocity. With consistent accuracy and fire, 
walls could easily be breeched with successive hits. Second, 
the by-product of these impacts was the eruption of vast 
amounts shrapnel provided by the material of the walls. This 
factor proved deadly to men inside the fort where little 
refuge could be found when the hail of small missiles 
erupted forth from the wall after being impacted by cannon 
fire. For this reason, European designers began to lower the 
walls of their defenses and place them behind mounds of 
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earth. Earth was elastic enough to absorb the impact of the 
hit with no appreciable damage. In conjunction with this, 
these earthen defensive works were moved further away from 
the walls of the fort to deny the artillery the necessary 
proximity to exhibit direct fire on the walls to ensue a 
breech.163  
 So why is it that the Americans suddenly decided to 
abandon this accepted rule of strategic design? The answer 
is quite simple: the rules that applied to European 
fortresses were customized to defensive works on land 
protecting strategic land routes and population centers. The 
American emphasis was on seaward defense, not landward. The 
threat of siege artillery was not as great because ships as 
gun platforms were not accurate enough and could not get 
close enough to effect a typical artillery siege barrage. 
Time and improvements in rifled artillery would prove to be 
the death knell of this concept, but at the beginning of its 
theoretical development, the reliance on relatively small 
smoothbore cannon made its success a very real 
possibility.164  
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Confederate held Ft. Pulaski in Savannah, GA during the Civil War in 
April, 1862. During this campaign the seven and one-half foot thick brick 
walls of the two tiered fortress were breeched by rifled artillery shells 
fired from over a mile away. The twenty-four hour bombardment had 
accomplished in a day what would have taken smoothbore cannon much longer 
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 It was under these conditions that the greatest 
peacetime U. S. defensive construction program of the 19th 
century was begun. This largest of programs was begun in a 
time of peace in 1817, when no threat, foreign or domestic, 
was perceived by the U.S. This is a unique circumstance in 
itself in that all previous military expenditures were as a 
result of a direct military threat. The fact that expediency 
was not required in this circumstance allowed emphasis to be 
placed on the creation of a truly permanent and integrated 
system of harbor defenses. Individual engineers who had 
worked independently of one another with very vague 
guidelines provided by the Secretary of War constructed the 
works of the first two systems. For the third system, a 
board was appointed to coordinate and supervise construction 
of all works in the new system and to ensure their 
characteristics and effectiveness. The board was organized 
in late 1816 and was placed under the control of Simon 
Bernard, a former brigadier general under Napoleon.165 Upon 
being recommended by Lafayette he came to the United States 
where he was given a commission of the same grade. The 
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original purpose of the board was to evaluate not only 
defensive works but also interior lines of communications 
and transportation and all other aspects associated with a 
unified defensive plan.166 
 A key aspect of this was the navy. It is at this 
juncture that I will iterate in brief the gunboat navy 
developed in the early 1800s by the Jefferson 
administration. A southern and western administration with 
little direct ties in a maritime system, they were not at 
all motivated to put forth the funds needed for a large 
offensive blue-water navy. Instead the administration set 
itself upon a naval policy focusing on a strictly defensive 
coastal fleet comprised of small gunboats. The President 
sold this notion to the Congress by citing examples that all 
nations used a similar fleet of vessels and the Barbary 
pirates of North Africa had made particularly good use of 
them in combat. So beginning in 1805, instead of 
constructing larger warships of the line, like 74-gun ships, 
the Congress funded the construction of twenty-five small 
fifty to seventy-five foot single and double gunned boats 
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for harbor defense.167 This action was repeated over the next 
successive years, but given the unexpected rapid rate at 
which these small vessels decayed varying amounts had to 
constructed every year in order to reach the recommended 257 
needed for an “adequate” defense. By 1807, when the program 
was seriously cut back, there were over 176 in service.168 
These small gunboats were to be used in conjuncture with 
defensive works to create a unified umbrella of defense for 
American harbors. 
 The Bernard Board explained the necessity of 
maintaining a significant and capable naval arm in order to 
accurately defend the American coast. In its first report 
issued in 1821, the board voiced what was an early form 
naval strategy that would later be adopted and printed by 
Alfred Thayer Mahan. Essentially, the board began to 
evaluate what harbors and anchorages would be necessary to 
provide effective bases of operations for naval forces, and 
as a secondary thought planned the defensive works needed to 
defend these strategic ports. This view essentially voiced 
the notion that although defensive in a tactical sense, 
fortifications served an offensive role in the strategic 
sense. Forts defended principle ports from invasion in a 
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tactical sense but in the strategic sense the defense and 
preservation of one’s base of supplies and maintenance acts 
in an offensive role, by protecting one’s ability to fight 
and wage war.  
Ironically the notion that these structures should be 
manned intermittently at best in times of peace and even 
then by local state troops would prove to be terrific 
blunder in the ensuing Civil War. It was because of this 
tradition that so many of Federal defenses fell into the 
hands of the Confederacy. With little or no federal 
garrisons to man them, when states seceded, state troops 
simply marched in a commandeered them with little or no 
resistance.169 
 In this report, the board barely made mention of the 
first and second defensive systems at all. What few were not 
destroyed for the construction of newer defenses were 
updated and integrated into larger scaled defense plans. 
Most works of the new system were straightforward and linear 
in their construction. Some of the most spectacular 
defensive works in history stem from this construction 
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period. Sumter, Pulaski, Monroe, Pickens, and Jackson are 
just few of notoriety.  
This period of construction also resulted in some of 
the largest defenses ever constructed. Ft. Monroe in 
Virginia was designed to command the approaches to Hampton 
Roads and was the first work of the third system designed 
from the ground up.170 It was believed for many years to be 
the largest defensive work constructed that did not enclose 
a civilian population. The largest constructed at the time 
in regards to firepower was the formidable Ft. Jefferson 
constructed on Garden Key in the Dry Tortugas seventy miles 
west of Key West. It was constructed on a small atoll and 
cost over a dollar a brick just to have construction 
material shipped to the site for construction. Although 
never fully armed, it was designed to house over 450 guns 
and control the vital entrance to the Gulf of Mexico.171  
 Many of these forts would be constructed to house two 
or three tiers of cannon, most of which concentrated on the 
seaward side. Given that the bulk of fire would come from 
concealment behind walls, designers had to incorporate 
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design innovations that would allow the movement of cannon 
behind the walls to track a moving target while at the same 
time provide for the smallest opening possible to protect 
gun crews from small arms fire. The result was that by the 
1820s, gun tracking was maximized to 60° of horizontal 
movement. In return angles of intersection on exterior walls 
had to be of at least 120° in order to prevent blind spots 
form forming on the walls.172 This geometric standard laid 
the groundwork for the construction of forts of this era to 
follow a similar style of hexagonal shape. Defenses such as 
these constructed in areas of relative natural defense from 
land assault i.e. marshes, salt lands, etc. were usually 
devoid of defensives bastions. Many also had their landward 
facing side truncated, as can be seen in the design 
characteristics of Ft. Sumter in South Carolina and Ft. 
Pulaski in Georgia.173 Most of these forts were also 
constructed only a few feet above the water so as to deny 
approaching vessels the ability to sneak under their guns 
and also to aid gunners in “skipping” their cannonballs 
across the water to exact damage on an enemy ship. The forts 
being constructed of durable brick could be built this close 
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to the hostile environment of the sea with little concern 
for its corrosive nature.  
Armament 
 
 The downfall of this magnificent era of coastal defense 
architecture would be the rifled cannon. Whereas the 
military engineers in Europe learned of the devastation 
caused by direct fire from close smooth bore cannon, so to 
would American defenders learn the same results from long 
distance rifled cannon. Rifled cannon were able to fire 
their elongated projectile a much greater distance at high 
velocity and with more accuracy than had been imagined just 
a few years before. This quantum leap in coastal armament 
rehashed the weakness of high-walled defenses again and made 
them obsolete.  
A textbook example of this comes from the fall of Ft. 
Pulaski in Savannah, Georgia. In March 1862 it became the 
first victim of long range rifled artillery of the American 
Civil War. Using ten rifles and twenty-six smoothbores, 
Union troops were able to breech the 7.5-foot thick walls in 
a little more than twenty-four hours. What is of 
significance to note is that the Union batteries were over a 
mile away, a feet rarely accomplished before.174 
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 Much of the artillery available to defend U.S. harbors 
in the first and second system of forts were leftover 
European pieces from the colonial period. The size of these 
cannon was measured in the weight of the shot they fired. 
The largest in service around the time of the first system 
would have been a few 32-pounder and 42-pounder guns. Their 
weights and quality varied given their age and some were 
still cast from bronze. In 1794 the bill passed providing 
funding for the fortifications also provided for the 
founding of newer artillery.175 These guns were all 
smoothbore firing round shot and had a relative range of 
under two thousand yards with a five degree elevation 
offered by the carriages they were mounted on. By the Second 
series of construction a few 50-pounder guns were being cast 
and placed in key defensive works. New pieces of artillery 
called Columbaids were developed around 1810 and could fire 
exploding shells as well as solid shot.176 Exploding shells 
were normally reserved for smaller cannon or high angle 
weapons like mortars and howitzers. They were also capable 
of firing at almost any degree of inclination, not limited 
to five degrees of early cannon style. This effectively 
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tripled the range of coastal artillery. These guns were 
revolutionary and were one of the first major American 
contributions to the world of artillery.  
 Cannon size remained relatively the same until the 
1820s when cannon design began to change dramatically. The 
Bernard Board had originally called for cannon no larger the 
24-pounders, but this notion was soon discarded. Studies in 
metallurgy and ballistics soon paved the way for 
advancements in artillery. Smoothbore technology reached its 
zenith in the 1840s with creations by Thomas Rodman and John 
Dahlgren.177 By studying the design characteristics of cannon 
and how gasses expanded in the chamber when exploded, they 
were able to reinvent that art of cannon casting.  
The most notable factor was the appearance of the new 
cannons. They were rather bulbous in the rear, smooth on the 
exterior, and tapered to the muzzle. This style was a 
reflection of the expansion characteristics of gas in the 
gun when fired. By following these lines and making the 
cannon take the shape of the explosion, the gasses could 
travel more freely with less pressure, thereby decreasing 
the chance of explosion. Another major change was the way in 
which the guns were cooled after forging. Standard practice 
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was to cool the outside of the gun first; this caused the 
breech to be of weaker construction than the outside wall. 
Rodman discovered that by cooling the inside of the barrel 
first, it became less stressed during the process, and the 
cooling of the bore first followed by the exterior served to 
compress and reinforce the structural integrity of the bore 
making it more resilient to pressure and stress.178 
 The result of these design changes were cannons much 
larger and safer than had ever been constructed. Rodman’s 
15-inch gun became the standard for seacoast defense 
artillery. It was easily the most powerful service cannon in 
the world at the time. Many remained in service from the 
Civil War up to the 1900s. It was after the adoption of 
these weapons that artillery became more commonly referred 
to in the inch size of the projectile they fired instead of 
the weight of their shot. As an example a 10-inch Rodman 
cannon fired a one hundred twenty-five pound shot and a 15-
inch could fire a four hundred thirty-four pound shot.179  
 It was the production and use of rifled artillery that 
closed the chapter on the magnificent masonry forts. Most 
common of these were of the design by Robert Parrott. His 
cast iron guns were produced in numbers exceeding one 
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thousand seven hundred during the Civil War.180 They were 
found in many weights from 10 to 300-pounders. While the 
chamber pressures associated with both smoothbores and 
rifles were comparable, the elongated and aerodynamic shape 
of the rifles projectile ensured a much longer and flatter 
trajectory. The effective range of a 20-pound Parrott rifle 
was 4,400 yards at a 15° elevation, while a mammoth 100-
pounder was effective to a distance of 7,180 yards with a 25° 
elevation.181 These weapons and the type of projectiles they 
fired were able to accomplish quickly and easily what it had 
traditionally taken a long and tedious bombardment of 
smoothbore cannon to do. What was demonstrated very clearly 
is that if man can overcome natural barriers such as oceans 
and mountains, then stagnant defenses created by man himself 
will surely fall when left to defend themselves. 
 As significant as the development of these weapons were 
for the defenders of the forts, what is paramount in this 
research is what became instrumental in the destruction of 
the myth of reliance on fortifications as the defenders of 
American soil. Maritime strategy is the collective 
collaboration between three crucial elements: 
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1. An effective force projecting blue-water fleet that 
while acting in a offensive role tactically is in 
actuality a defensive arm strategically in that its 
actions are in defense of its home base and its state’s 
political and economic interests abroad. 
2. A series of defendable harbors and ports that can 
adequately supply and maintain the naval arm of the 
defense while at the same time aid in the deterrence of 
allowing an enemy the use of the same harbors for his 
own means. In this aspect the defenses of harbors serve 
as an offensive strategic weapon because they provide 
the means for the way in which the war is fought and 
won. 
3. An acceptable infrastructure and interior lines of 
communications that can provide logistical support 
efficiently when needed and have easily defended 
strategic centers, which are supplemented by a mobile 
and effective response force. 
With the reliance on isolated defensive posts and no 
buffering force projecting fleet, the maritime strategy 
centered on defensive works alone was doomed to fail. The 
advent of newer and more effective artillery simply 
reinforced this accepted fact. As time would show the U.S. 
did adjust its strategy in the late 19th century, almost to 
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the opposite extreme. The state of U.S. coastal defense 
during the Spanish American War could have had disastrous 
results had not the American Navy had such a vast naval 
superiority over the Spanish. Surely the stereotypical 
conservative mind of the military leadership feared 
moderation in that day as well as it always has. The net 
result was that the Jeffersonian notion of relying strictly 
on a defensive military capability for protection and a 
policy of using American commerce and trade as a weapon of 
policy control over Europe was flawed and ineffective at 
protecting American commercial interests. As was clearly 
demonstrated, balance and moderation in military capability 
was then, and is today, necessary in an effective defense 
policy. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
 The early maritime history of the United States is a 
unique paradox of extensive commercial efficiency and 
military ineptness. This research has illustrated the 
complexity of politics, economics, and the military in the 
early years of the republic. The maritime defense policy of 
the Jeffersonian persuasion failed but in an unexpected way. 
His ideals for defense succeeded militarily but failed 
politically. 
As events proved, the Jeffersonian maritime initiative 
failed to provide protection to American maritime commercial 
interests. This assessment is based upon the Mahan’s 
philosophy that the primary purpose of a navy and maritime 
defense is the protection of commerce upon the sea. In a 
view of war, more in line with Clausewitz’s interpretation, 
Jefferson’s maritime strategy did not fail. If Clausewitz is 
correct that war is the ultimate expression of will on 
another, and military forces, including naval, are the means 
by which arms are delivered, then the American navy proved 
reluctantly adequate in resisting armed aggression. The 
proof of this is echoed by the fact that America was not 
assimilated back into the British Empire, nor was she 
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controlled by any other nation. Jefferson’s tactics and 
strategies may not have achieved many tactical victories, 
but strategic victory is often achieved through apparent 
tactical defeats. 
 My argument is analogous to Washington’s strategy 
during the American Revolution. Time after time he was 
defeated on the battlefield by the British. Given the 
accepted principles of warfare at the time, his repeated 
loss of the battlefield meant defeat. Pragmatically, 
however, so long as his army was defeated, not destroyed, he 
was still victorious. Neither Washington, nor anyone else 
would argue that this would have been the ideal way to wage 
the war and win, but it did prove successful. Washington was 
forced to think outside of the box in order to best use his 
limited army in a manner that would preserve it. If the 
ultimate goal of war is to disarm an enemy, the failure to 
do so and achieve total control negates any tactical 
victory.  
 As explained in this research, Jeffersonian maritime 
defense relied upon two principles, the use of economic 
coercion as an offensive weapon and the use of the navy and 
harbor defenses in a strictly defensive nature. The 
motivating force behind these two principles was the 
elimination of the national debt and reduced federal 
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spending. Between 1801 and 1812, the Republicans reduced the 
national debt by $38 million, or about 40%.182 It has been 
clearly expressed how most of Jefferson’s military ideas 
conflicted with accepted strategic doctrine. There is no 
doubt that had proper funds and support been directed toward 
the navy early in the republic, events would have unfolded 
very differently. It is unlikely given the population and 
industry available, that America could have constructed a 
fleet to rival Great Britain or France in standard naval 
combat. However, it might have been possible for the nation 
to develop a sizeable enough force to prove decisive in an 
active defense given factors such as distance an enemy fleet 
must travel from its bases to attack the U.S. coast, etc. 
 With this being said, the Jeffersonian defense oriented 
maritime strategy succeeded in preventing our assimilation 
by another national entity. The reason it succeeded was 
because it had elements of compromise from Federalist naval 
proponents at its disposal. Federalist spending was kept 
under control so as not to cause the new American debt to 
grow to rapidly; which could have caused a great deal of 
internal strife and resentment leading to factionalization 
and political and civic turmoil. Heavy taxation to 
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compensate for an accelerated debt could have led to another 
revolution in such a young republic.  
The Federalists super-frigates constructed were 
essential in helping deter enemy aggression and forcing 
aggressor nations into investing so much cost and effort as 
to limit their window of operations. Because of their 
constant warfare, distance from the U.S., and the presence 
of a small yet effective military force, France and England 
simply could not divert the time and resources needed to 
effectively campaign against the American establishment long 
enough to win. 
 This moderation between Jeffersonian thrift and 
Federalist spending produced a sufficient enough force, 
albeit not ideal, to preserve American independence. But, it 
would not preserve Jefferson’s political dreams for the 
country. Under the onslaught of industrial and commercial 
interests, Jefferson’s defensive agenda proved too costly 
not for American independence but for American commerce. The 
economic damage done by his Non-Importation Act, embargos, 
and the inability of the defensive American Navy to break 
the British blockade of 1812 proved too much for the 
political motivated wealthy elite. After 1812, the Federal 
government decided not to allow American commerce to be 
bottled up again in time of war. A construction program was 
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begun to modernize and increase the navy. This was one of 
many first steps that led to the increase in the authority 
of the Federal government and American maritime force.  
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